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Article

The First Amendment Implications of
Copyright’s Double Standard
Raymond Shih Ray Ku1
I. INTRODUCTION
Copyright law has First Amendment problems. On its face, copyright is
consistent with freedom of expression. However, its interpretation is subject to a
content-based bias against “entertainment” that renders its application
constitutionally problematic and, arguably, unconstitutional. The scope of
copyright liability, and the extent to which it both chills and punishes copying for
the purpose of expressing one’s “taste and opinion,” imposes a double standard
that denies authors of these works the freedom to incorporate the work of others.
In contrast, all other authors may borrow freely from other works so long as they
do not tell the same story or retell that story in another medium, which this Article
describes as “virtual appropriation.” This double standard is created through a
series of inconsistent, contradictory, and hypocritical interpretations of copyright
and, in the end, is based upon a judicial elitism that dismisses the value of works
of entertainment and the creative choices of those authors.
The copyright infringement action brought against Robin Thicke and
Pharrell Williams is illustrative. Marvin Gaye’s family argued that Thicke’s and
Williams’s smash hit, “Blurred Lines,” infringed Marvin Gaye’s copyrighted
music and lyrics to “Got to Give it Up.”2 During the litigation, Thicke testified that
he wanted Williams to write a song that had the same groove as Gaye’s song. 3 In
writing the song, Williams testified that the only thing the songs had in common
was their feel.4 When one listens to both songs, there is a clear similarity of feel
between the recordings.5 And, the litigation arose because Williams clearly
captured the groove.6 But should an artist be punished for capturing the groove of
another artist? How does one even define the groove or determine what constitutes
the groove? Does it matter that the specific question was not whether the
recordings had a similar feel, but whether Williams reproduced protected elements
of Gaye’s sheet music to achieve that feel? Even though the sheet music did not
1
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contain many elements of Gaye’s sound recording, the jury was allowed to
determine whether Thicke and Williams, nonetheless, copied “too much” from
Gaye.7 Ultimately, the jury sided with the Gaye family and awarded over seven
million dollars in damages, one of the largest verdicts in copyright history. 8
Decisions like “Blurred Lines” result from an interpretation of copyright
law that punishes new authors for copying even the most intangible aspects of a
prior work, even if they are unaware that they are copying. 9 This is not the
traditional or “easy” case of copyright infringement where defendants simply
duplicate/pirate the copyright owner’s work. Instead, authors may be punished for
using even the ideas from another work if courts conclude that their purpose is to
entertain. As this article demonstrates, this subjective evaluation of the merits of
expression is reserved exclusively for so-called works of “entertainment.”10 Under
similar circumstances, a historian or painter would not have faced a jury because
they would have been protected by the idea/expression distinction, the doctrine of
fair use, or both.
As applied to entertainment, copyright is both impermissibly contentbased and unconstitutionally vague. In other words, copyright law imposes
substantial liability on expression based upon the content of speech and does so
based upon rules that do not delineate clear borders between prohibited and
permissible expression (i.e., when a speaker may “copy” another). 11 Instead,
copyright law’s blurred lines force future authors of works that might be
categorized as entertainment into revising their intended expression, foregoing it
altogether, or running the risk of defending against allegations of infringement and
the imposition of substantial monetary damages. While the lines may be blurred,
the message is clear: copy at your own risk.
Copyright’s constitutional problems are the products of an inconsistent,
contradictory and hypocritical bias against entertainment. This bias is exemplified
by a statement made by a former register of copyright. In rejecting the proposition
that file-sharing services -- at the time, Napster -- promoted creativity and human
understanding by facilitating access to music and other creative works, the register
began his defense of copyright liability with the rhetorical question, “What’s the
big deal? It’s just entertainment.”12 In other words, denying individuals access to
the music of their choice is not a significant harm because the music, while
valuable financially, has little substantive value. Put another way, there is little, if
any, harm when members of the public cannot listen to Bruno Mars either because
they cannot afford or are unwilling to agree to the copyright owner’s demands.
Meanwhile, allowing people to access the song for free denies the copyright owner
control of, and, potentially, compensation for the song. The situation is considered
different if the public were denied access to educational content or to content that
might inspire future thinkers, but not to a pop song. As discussed below, Justice
Blackmun made this very argument in Sony v. Universal City Studios, the
landmark decision in which the Supreme Court concluded that the personal
7

Williams v. Gaye, 885 F.3d 1150, 1167—70 (9th Cir. 2018).
Grow, supra note 2.
9
Three Boys Music v. Michael Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 486 (9th Cir. 2000) (concluding that Michael
Bolton subconsciously copied the Isley Brothers’ “Love is a Wonderful Thing”); Bright Tunes Music v.
Harrisongs Music, 420 F. Supp. 177, 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (concluding that George Harrison
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copying made possible by the VCR was a fair use.13 Despite losing in that decision,
Justice Blackmun’s position has largely won the day.14
The bias against entertainment is not limited to the right of audiences to
receive speech. It applies equally to speakers as well. The position that “it’s just
entertainment” justifies restricting the freedom of authors creating new works that
are considered works of entertainment. Once again, we are told that denying an
author the freedom to create expression as they see fit, for the purposes they see
fit, is not a big deal. If it is not a big deal to deny a listener access to Bruno Mars,
it is also not a big deal to deny writers and performers of popular music the ability
to “copy” Bruno Mars. Recognizing this judicial and doctrinal bias against
entertainment lends clarity to some of the most difficult and opaque areas of
copyright law, and reveals an inconsistent, hypocritical, and arguably
unconstitutional regulation of speech.
Moreover, as the bias against entertainment is found both implicitly and
explicitly in the very copyright doctrines that are supposed to safeguard freedom
of expression -- the idea/expression distinction and the doctrine of fair use -- it
raises serious First Amendment questions. Why are restrictions upon
entertainment not a big deal? How does speech that entertains differ from other
speech? How can courts determine when speech is “just entertainment” without
injecting their own subjective biases? What must authors do in terms of their own
creativity to overcome this bias? Put another way, is it consistent with the First
Amendment to allow judges and juries to punish speech they consider unworthy
because of a purpose to entertain? This Article argues no, and that the New York
Times v. Sullivan15 line of cases dealing with defamation should guide First
Amendment analysis of copyright. Because of the inherent difficulty in punishing
speech based upon a subjective evaluation of its purpose and creativity, courts
must guarantee sufficient breathing space for individuals to express themselves
when they choose to do so by incorporating the works of others.
Part II introduces the “What’s the big deal? It’s just entertainment,”
argument, and how the Supreme Court responded in two landmark decisions: Sony
Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.16 and Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing
Co.17 Part II.A. demonstrates that the common understanding of these cases
overlooks the importance of their relationship to entertainment, and their clear
rejection of subjecting works of entertainment to a different standard under
copyright law. In Sony, this requires a careful analysis of the Supreme Court’s
justification for concluding that fair use encompasses home video recording of
television programming even if that use is not productive.
Part II.B. then argues that the full import of Justice Holmes’ famous
opinion in Bleistein, adopting what has become copyright’s bedrock principle of
non-discrimination, can only be understood when his opinion is recognized as part
of a much larger debate on the scope of Congress’ powers to recognize copyright
in order to “promote the progress of science and the useful arts.”18 Part II.B. argues
13

464 U.S, 417 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
See infra Part III.
15
376 U.S. 254 (1964)
16 Id. (majority opinion).
17 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
18 U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. For a similar approach to Bleistein but in relation to the definition of
progress under the Copyright Clause see Barton Beebe, Bleistein, The Problem of Aesthetic Progress,
and the Making of American Copyright Law, 117 Colum. L. Rev. 319, 351 (2017). I am deeply indebted
to Beebe’s work as it led me to reconsider the decision with respect to the relationship between the
Copyright Clause and entertainment. But see Ned Snow, The Regressing Progress Clause: Rethinking
Constitutional Indifference to Harmful Content in Copyright, 47 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1, 10-18 (2013)
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that the Supreme Court’s decision was a direct response to and rejection of the
argument that neither works of “fine art” nor entertainment -- but especially not
works of entertainment -- were sufficiently valuable to fall under Congress’ power
to grant exclusive rights under the Copyright Clause. The Constitutional
importance of this conclusion cannot be overstated, as it represents a fundamental
rejection of the argument that the Copyright Clause justifies content-based
discrimination.
Part III demonstrates that despite the approaches taken by the Supreme
Court in Sony and Bleistein, courts have interpreted the otherwise neutral
idea/expression distinction and doctrine of fair use to discriminate against works
of entertainment. Part III.A. demonstrates that courts have recognized two separate
categories of ideas: those that “advance the understanding of phenomena or the
solution of problems” and those that are infused only with “the author’s taste or
opinion.”19 In Part III.B., this Article demonstrates that the promise that fair use
will protect the freedom of future authors to create works of their own when they
use other works as raw material for their own creative expression is illusory when
it comes to entertainment.
In Part IV, this Article critically examines the principal justification for
a double standard: that factual works (works that seek to explain phenomena or to
provide solutions to problems) are fundamentally different from entertainment,
which critics historically described as frivolous works (those representing the
author’s taste and opinion). Part IV.A. explores whether there are inherent
differences justifying a greater tolerance or need for copying in science than in
entertainment and contends that the “facts are different” argument mistakenly
conflates conclusions with expression. Because works of science answer problems
or propose solutions, it is perhaps inevitable and even desirable that multiple
authors reach the same conclusion. However, recognizing that authors should be
free to and may inevitably reach the same conclusion does not mean that they must
repeat the original author’s expression or get there without having to contribute
something of their own. Part IV.B. considers the various instrumental justifications
for a double standard, and argues that those reasons apply equally to entertainment.
Moreover, to the extent that more limited copyright protection is justified based
upon the likelihood that future expression will be chilled, Part IV.C. argues that
this argument weighs in favor of works of entertainment because the creative
expression of those authors is more likely to be chilled by copyright liability.
Finally, Part V considers the First Amendment implications of
recognizing copyright discrimination against entertainment, and argues that there
are no objective reasons for imposing greater restrictions upon creators of socalled works of “taste and opinion.” It begins by explaining the Supreme Court’s
current understanding of the relationship between copyright and freedom of
speech, and its reliance upon the idea/expression distinction and fair use. Part V.A.
explains why these doctrines cannot be relied upon to safeguard First Amendment
interests. Both doctrines allow judges to engage in a form of copyright Lochnerism
in which their personal opinions on the value of entertainment not only define the
scope of copyright, but alter the boundaries of free speech as well. Part V.B. argues
that copyright’s double standard represents a content-based regulation of speech.
It is void-for-vagueness. As Bleistein recognized, attempting to separate the fine
arts from entertainment is fundamentally fraught with difficulty. And, to the extent
(arguing that the courts have erroneously expanded reach of the Copyright Clause under the principle of
non-discrimination).
19 See CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reps., Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 71 (2d Cir. 1994).
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that the idea/expression distinction and fair use doctrine are used to justify a double
standard, they themselves are unconstitutionally vague.
Part V.C. highlights the First Amendment problems raised by a contentneutral expansion of copyright protection. In other words, is it constitutional to
eliminate copyright’s double standard by imposing the same heightened standard
of liability (currently limited to entertainment) to all works? Part V.C. argues that
the expanding copyright under those circumstances cannot satisfy intermediate
scrutiny let alone strict scrutiny. Neither a desire for a greater variety of expression
nor increasing the gatekeeping powers of existing copyright owners, therefore
increasing their relative power in the marketplace of ideas, are legitimate
government interests. Not only are these interests illegitimate, they are clearly
related to the suppression of expression. Lastly, Part V.D. explains why expanding
copyright protection beyond virtual appropriation raises problems with regard to
the constitutional fit between ends and means. In other words, exclusive rights
arguably suppress more speech than necessary to protect the legitimate interests
of authors. In both Parts V.C. and V.D., this Article argues that the New York Times
v. Sullivan line of cases dealing with defamation should guide this First
Amendment analysis.
II. WHO CARES ABOUT HONEY BOO BOO? THE SUPREME COURT.
Modern copyright law traces its origins to the English Statute of Anne,
which expressly recognized that the purpose of copyright was to encourage
learning,20 and to the U.S. Constitution, which empowers Congress “to promote
the progress of science and the useful arts by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”21
In light of these stated purposes, the statement, “What’s the big deal? It’s just
entertainment,” seems perfectly reasonable. If the purpose of copyright is to
encourage learning and promote progress, one might expect courts to distinguish
works that are consistent with the Copyright Clause from those that are not. Doing
so would require courts to define “science” and “the useful arts,” and to determine
when a work fits within either of those definitions. While physics is a science, is
philosophy? Medical journals advance science, but do sculptures? Do cartoons?
Nevertheless, it is almost universally accepted that copyright law should not
discriminate based upon the subject matter let alone the content of a work.
Currently, copyright protects all creative works, scientific publications and
broadcasts of NBA basketball, works of fiction as well as pornography, statues,
and stuffed animals.22 With respect to stuffed animals and similar works, Justice
Douglas once noted that copyright protects,
[S]tatuettes, book ends, clocks, lamps, door knockers,
candlesticks, inkstands, . . . and ash trays. Perhaps these are
‘writings’ in the constitutional sense. But to me, at least, they
are not obviously so. It is time we came to the problem full

20

Copyright Act of 1709, 8 Ann. c. 21.
U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
22 See, e.g., Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 848 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting that
broadcasts of the NBA and other sporting events are subject to copyright protection); Ty, Inc. v. GMA
Accessories, Inc., 132 F.3d 1167, 1169 (7th Cir. 1997) (recognizing copyright protection for Beanie
Babies); Mitchell Brothers Films Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 863 (5th Cir. 1979)
(“Congress has not chosen to refuse copyrights on obscene materials …”).
21
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face.23
While Justice Douglas was referring to the Copyright Clause’s definition of
writings, one may be tempted to argue that the Clause’s reference to science and
the useful arts is also a lingering question; you would be wrong. As this Part
demonstrates, the Supreme Court has responded to the question, “What’s the big
deal? It’s just entertainment?” with a question of its own: “Who are we to judge?”
Part II.A. introduces this problem and demonstrates that it was a critical issue in
Sony. The decision illustrates both the persistence of these doubts, as represented
by Justice Blackmun’s dissent, and how Justice Stevens’ majority opinion may not
have been as clear as one might expect. Part II.B. argues that while this uncertainty
may be traced back to Justice Holmes’ conclusory and almost dismissive opinion
in Bleistein, when that opinion is recognized as the final word in a much a larger
debate on the scope of the Copyright Clause, it becomes clear why the nondiscrimination principle has been and should continue to be a guiding principle of
copyright law.
A. Sony v. Universal City Studios: Audiences
“What’s the big deal? It’s just entertainment,” is more than the opinion
of one individual. It is a significant, if sometimes unstated, perspective in
copyright law. Consider the Supreme Court’s landmark decision, Sony v.
Universal City Studios, in which a majority of the Supreme Court concluded that
unauthorized home recording of television programming was fair use.24 Sony
recognized the freedom of individuals to make copies for personal use even when
copyright owners object. In Sony, the specific personal use was recording a
television program to watch at a different time.25 This personal use led to the
growth of video recording from the VCR to the DVR. With respect to music,
personal uses include the creation of mixtapes for a Walkman or playlists for an
iPhone, ripping music from compact discs to one’s computer and uploading music
to a digital music player. Individuals are also free to make personal copies of texts
and images by hand, photocopier, scanner, or camera as part of personal use.26 On
its face, Sony clearly holds that the recording of entertainment is as much a fair
use as the recording of news or education programming. In other words, it is a big
deal to the viewing public.27 Nonetheless, given the reach of the decision, one
might find it surprising that the Court did not explicitly address whether the
recording of educational programming or news should be treated differently than
the recording of a sitcom or reality television. As the following demonstrates, this
issue did arise, but only obliquely.
When the Supreme Court concluded that copyright law did not prohibit
the home recording of television programming, it did so without distinguishing
between the types of programs being recorded.28 As such, it is equally fair to record
an episode of PBS’s Frontline or Mr. Roger’s Neighborhood as it would be to
record an episode of Seinfeld or Here Comes Honey Boo Boo. The Supreme Court,
however, was sharply divided 5-4 in the decision. Writing for the dissent, Justice
23

Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 221 (1954) (Douglas, J., concurring).
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442-56 (1984).
25 Id. at 455.
26
See generally, Jessica Litman, Lawful Personal Use, 785 Tex. L. Rev. 1871 (2006-2007) (analyzing
both the history of personal uses as fair uses and arguing for expanded recognition).
27 Sony, 464 U.S. at 454-56.
28 Id. at 443-46.
24
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Blackmun disputed that fair use should include watching television programming
like Honey Boo Boo. After all, a significant portion of television programming at
issue was “just entertainment.”29
Here Comes Honey Boo Boo was a popular television program that
follows Alana “Honey Boo Boo” Thompson and her family. 30 Honey Boo Boo
originally gained popularity as a child beauty pageant participant documented in
the program Toddlers and Tiaras.31 For the purposes of this discussion, whether
the copyrighted work is a television program like Here Comes Honey Boo Boo,
Dancing with the Stars, or Breaking Bad, a novel such as Harry Potter and the
Half-Blood Prince or Fifty Shades of Grey, a popular song like “Blurred Lines” or
“All About the Bass,” or a video game like Rayman Raving Rabbids or Cuphead,
is irrelevant. Instead, this Article uses Honey Boo Boo as a proxy for any and all
works that may be considered “just entertainment” or, even more harshly, as
nothing more than a distraction, a circus, or an opiate for the masses.
The majority in Sony concluded that the unauthorized personal recording
of broadcast television programs was a fair use because it expanded the audience
for programming.32 Home recording allowed members of the public to watch
television programs that they would otherwise not have been able to watch. 33 In
reaching this conclusion the majority also relied upon the fact that the copyright
owners could not demonstrate that such copying was “harmful, or that if it should
become widespread, it would adversely affect the potential market for the
copyrighted work.”34 The district court found no evidence that home recording
would harm the size of live audiences or the ratings and revenues derived from
viewership.35 Likewise, the Court found no evidence that home recording would
hurt theatrical releases, reruns, or rentals.36 In the absence of evidence indicating
that home recording would harm these revenue sources, increasing access to
television outweighed the copyright owners’ desire to control the conditions of
that access.37
In contrast, Justice Blackmun argued for the dissent that home recording was not
a fair use because watching television was not a “productive use,”38 or as discussed
later, a transformative use.39 Simply watching television was not a valuable use of
a copyrighted work, and as such, restricting the number of individuals who might
watch a television program was not a loss to society. Justice Blackmun compared
the relative harms to society of denying an “ordinary user” access to a television
show to the harms of denying a scholar access to research materials. According to
Blackmun, when the ordinary user of a copyrighted work is denied access, “only
the individual is the loser.”40 In contrast, “when the scholar forgoes the use of a
prior work, not only does his own work suffer, but the public is deprived of his
contribution to knowledge.”41 According to Blackmun, the doctrine of fair use
29

Id. at 477-81 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Here Comes Honey Boo Boo, Wikipedia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Here_Comes_Honey_Boo_Boo (last visited May 28, 2018).
31 Id.
32 Sony, 464 U.S. at 421 & 454.
33
Id. at 421.
34 Id. at 451.
35 Id. at 452-53.
36 Id. at 453.
37 Id. at 454.
38
Id. at 478-79 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
39
See infra Part III.B.
40 Sony, 464 U.S. at 477 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
41 Id. at 477-78.
30
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should only protect uses equivalent to the scholar’s copying, and he notes that the
examples provided by the Copyright Act and by the legislative history are all
examples of “productive” or “socially laudable” uses.42 According to the dissent,
watching television is not a “socially laudable” use.43 There is no loss to society if
an audience member cannot watch the trials and tribulations of Honey Boo Boo;
and even if some loss exists, it is easily outweighed by the interests of copyright
owners in setting the conditions for audiences to access copyrighted programming.
Justice Stevens’ majority opinion responds to the dissenters in a footnote.
According to Justice Stevens, while the distinction between productive and
unproductive uses may be helpful, it is not dispositive.44 “Although copying to
promote a scholarly endeavor certainly has a stronger claim to fair use than
copying to avoid interrupting a poker game, the question is not simply twodimensional.”45 In attempting to identify the social good created by gaining access
to Here Comes Honey Boo Boo, Justice Stevens essentially argues that it is difficult
to determine when society benefits:
A teacher who copies to prepare lecture notes is clearly
productive. But so is a teacher who copies for the sake of
broadening his understanding of his specialty. Or a legislator
who copies for the sake of broadening her understanding of
what her constituents are watching; or a constituent who copies
a news program to help make a decision on how to vote.46
In other words, courts should not categorically require a use to be “productive”
because we can never say for certain that the unauthorized use will not lead to
socially valuable ends.47 As such, in the absence of evidence that personal copying
will seriously harm the ability of copyright owners to obtain compensation in other
markets, expanding the audience for copyrighted works is a sufficiently valuable
means to achieve ends that are themselves valuable to the public.48
By arguing that that we can never determine ex-ante when a particular
act of copying will lead to socially beneficial ends, and without differentiating
between the subject matter of the recorded programming, Justice Stevens hints at
an answer to the question, “Who cares about Honey Boo Boo?”. While the majority
specifically rejects the dissenting argument that watching television can never be
considered a fair use, implicit is also the idea that someone or everyone is harmed
if denied the opportunity to watch Honey Boo Boo.49 In other words, entertainment
can equally inform audience members about their profession, their constituents,
their civic duty, as well as contribute to more traditional productive copyright uses
such as the creation of new works. As such, being free to copy Honey Boo Boo is
important because the show is an important part of the audience’s search for
42

Id. at 477-80.
See id.
44 Id. at 455 n.40.
45 Id.
46
Id.
47 Rebecca Tushnet expands upon this idea and makes a detailed argument that the basic act of copying
itself should be protected by the First Amendment, and interpreting fair use to require a use be productive
or transformative, is inconsistent with freedom of speech. See Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How
Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 Yale L.J. 535 (2004).
48
Sony, 464 U.S. at 454 (“[T]o the extent that time-shifting expands public access, . . . it yields societal
benefits.”); see also Beebe, supra note 18, at 390 (arguing access is an important element of aesthetic
practice).
49 Id. at 455 n.40.
43

170

SPRING 2018

FIRST AMENDMENT & COPYRIGHT

VOL. 17:2

meaning, identity, and understanding. It may form the foundation of life choices
and public policy decisions. It may also provide an opportunity for reflection, or
an opportunity to experience a part of or the full spectrum of human emotion. So
even if it may not be a big deal to Justice Blackmun, it is a big deal to the audience
that would otherwise be denied access. If unauthorized access to entertainment is
important to the audience, it is equally important to the creators of that expression.
Unfortunately, crucial elements of the foundational Supreme Court opinion on this
subject are just as opaque as the opinions in Sony.
B. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographic: Authors
Equal treatment under copyright originates with the Supreme Court’s
decision in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographic.50 In that decision, Justice Holmes
first articulated copyright’s non-discrimination principle.51 As Barton Beebe’s
recent article demonstrates, the issues presented in Bleistein are far more
complicated and nuanced than generally understood.52 As this section explains, the
implications and meaning of Justice Holmes’ opinion and how it might apply with
respect to the “just entertainment” argument can only be understood when his
opinion is read as part of a larger dialogue. For Beebe, this is an overarching
dialogue on the nature and definition of progress in copyright law, and how
Bleistein has been misunderstood and misapplied as the foundation for a definition
of progress focused upon material progress.53 He argues persuasively that Bleistein
is best understood as advocating for aesthetic progress. 54 The goal of this section
is more modest. It focuses more narrowly on Justice Holmes’ opinion as the final
word in the dialogue among the Supreme Court justices and the lower court judges
in Bleistein, and, in that context, what it has to say about the value of
entertainment.
The plaintiffs in Bleistein created three engravings: one depicted ballet
dancers, another depicted trick bicycle riding, and a third depicted performers
made to look like statutes.55 These engravings were used to print pamphlets
advertising the acts as part of a circus.56 When Bleistein and the other plaintiffs
sued for the unauthorized reproduction of these images, Donaldson Lithographic
Co. argued that the engravings were not protected by copyright and were
uncopyrightable.57 According to the district court, because Congress had limited
copyright protection for pictorial illustration to the “fine arts,” 58 “the prime
question is whether the things copyrighted here are pictorial illustrations
connected with the fine arts, or are such as are intended to be perfected as works
of the fine arts.”59 In finding for the defendant, the district court concluded that the
engravings were neither pictorial illustrations nor fine art. 60 With respect to the
50

188 U.S. 239 (1903).
Id. at 249-50.
52 See Beebe, supra note 18, at 338-39.
53 Id. at 371-78.
54 Id. at 386-95.
55
Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 248.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographic Co., 98 F. 608, 610 (C.C.D. Ky. 1899).
59 Id. In so finding, the court rejected Bleistein’s argument that the Copyright Act’s reference to pictorial
illustrations and to fine arts were separate and distinct. In other words, were they pictorial illustrations?
Even this was a source of debate because the posters included photographs and illustrations could be
limited illustrations within a book. Id.
60 Id. at 611.
51
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latter, the court considered the pictures to be “merely frivolous, and to some extent
immoral.”61
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit agreed that the prints had no connection with
the fine arts.62 It then went one step further concluding that it would be inconsistent
with the Constitution to protect a work with “no value aside from [the] function”
of advertising.63 In its view, Congress only has the power to extend copyright to
illustrations when those illustrations are connected to the fine arts. 64 While an
illustration that represented a “work of the imagination” might qualify even if used
as an advertisement, the pictures in question were the pictorial equivalent of labels
and were incapable of being protected by Congress. 65
The Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of the role of fine arts is noteworthy
for three reasons. First, it raised the stakes of the decision by deliberately elevating
the issue from statutory interpretation to constitutional interpretation. As
demonstrated by the district court’s opinion, the case could have been resolved by
statutory interpretation alone. Nonetheless, the court felt the need to address the
constitutional question, and in so doing, converted a statutory requirement into an
implied constitutional prerequisite.
Second, it highlighted an important debate over whether the Constitution
empowers Congress to protect the fine arts. While the district court found it
unnecessary to address the constitutional question, it likewise offered an opinion
on the scope of Congress’ power under Article I, Sec. 8. 66 However, unlike the
Court of Appeals, which concluded that the Constitution required a work to be one
of fine art, the district court doubted that works of fine art were proper subjects of
copyright at all; according to the district court,
Inasmuch as the constitutional provision[s] . . . only authorizes
congress to promote the “useful arts,” the curious might moot
the question of the power to promote any but the useful arts,
and consequently the lack of power to legislate to give
exclusive privileges respecting the fine arts, unless in cases
where they are also useful arts . . . .67
While the court recognized that it may be both difficult and undesirable to
distinguish between the useful arts and the fine arts, such a distinction was
possible.68 And, works of fine art and works of imagination are not useful. To
borrow from the court of appeals, they had no intrinsic value of their own under
the Constitution.69 As such, the district court questioned whether Congress had the
power to protect either the frivolous or the fine arts. The interpretation is consistent
with what Barton Beebe describes as the early American view that the fine arts
“were at best useless and at worst corrupting.”70 In contrast, the Sixth Circuit
opinion was consistent with the turn-of-the-century view that the Constitution’s
61

Id.
Courier Lithographing Co. v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 104 F. 993, 996 (6th Cir. 1900).
63 Id.
64
Id.
65 Id. at 996 (quoting Yuengling v. Schile, 12 F. 97, 100 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1882)).
66 Bleistein, 98 F. at 609-12.
67 Id. at 611. In a dissenting opinion in Bleistein, Justice Harlan literally copies the Sixth Circuit
opinion and adopts it as his own. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographic, 188 U.S. 239, 252-53 (1903)
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
68
Bleistein, 98 F. at 611.
69 Courier Lithographing, 104 F. at 996.
70 Beebe, supra note 18, at 339.
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reference to progress “empower[ed] courts to apply a strict definition of fine arts.
The thinking was that only aesthetic works that could satisfy this strict definition
would ‘promote the Progress.’”71
Third, neither court questioned its authority or competency to evaluate
whether works were frivolous or of fine art. To the contrary, both courts were so
confident that the illustrations in Bleistein were not fine art, they found in favor of
the defendant as a matter of law.72 Under these circumstances, the question was
not whether the illustrations were good or bad examples of art, but whether the
illustrations could be categorized as fine art.
By the time it reached the Supreme Court, the case raised two
fundamental questions for this analysis. First and foremost, is the power to
promote the progress of science and the useful arts limited only to those works, or
does it include the fine arts? Or, as Beebe describes, does the Constitution grant
Congress the power to promote aesthetic progress?73 Second, if Congress has the
power to protect works of fine art, were the lower courts correct in their unanimous
agreement that the illustrations in Bleistein were not examples of fine art? Justice
Holmes answered both question with a resounding “no.” Unfortunately, much like
Justice Stevens’ answer to, “Who cares about Honey Boo Boo?” Justice Holmes’
answer is much too brief and cursory given the weight and future implications of
the decision. As Beebe argues, “Holmes’s brief, breezy opinion mask[s] the
extraordinary tensions at work in the case and the fateful nature of Holmes’s
resolution of them.”74
Justice Holmes’s opinion flat-out rejects the argument that the fine arts
were not appropriate for protection under the Copyright Clause, and it does so in
a single conclusory sentence: “The Constitution does not limit the useful to that
which satisfies immediate bodily needs.” 75 His sole authority for this conclusion
is the Court’s earlier decision in Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, which
held that photographs fell within the constitutional definition of writings. 76 While
Burrow-Giles held that a photograph of Oscar Wilde could be protected by
copyright, it did so by concluding that photographs were sufficiently analogous to
writings protected by the first Congress.77 As such, the decision did not consider
the meaning of progress or the useful arts. Moreover, Justice Miller’s opinion
relied upon the original intent of the framers of the Constitution to reach that
conclusion,78 and it is doubtful that the framers intended to include the fine arts.
As Beebe demonstrates, the framers appeared to have deliberately excluded the
fine arts.79 So, to the extent that Burrow-Giles supported Holmes, it did so only
71

Id. at 357 (quoting U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8); see also Snow, supra note 18, at 6-9 (outlining earlier
interpretations of the Copyright Clause as excluding works that did not fall within the definition of
science).
72 Courier, 104 F. at 997; Bleistein, 98 F. at 613.
73 Beebe, supra note 18, at 327-28.
74 Id. at 349.
75 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographic Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249 (1903).
76 111 U.S. 53, 59.
77 Id. at 57.
78
Id. stating:
The construction placed upon the constitution by the first act of
1790 and the act of 1802, by the men who were contemporary with
its formation, many of whom were members of the convention
which framed it, is of itself entitled to very great weight, and when
it is remembered that the rights thus established have not been
disputed during a period of nearly a century, it is almost
conclusive.
79 See Beebe, supra note 18, at 337-42. See also Snow, supra note 18, at 8-9 (discussing the Framers’
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through a logical syllogism. A photograph of Oscar Wilde does not “satisf[y]
immediate bodily needs.”80 A photograph can be copyrighted. Therefore, works
that do not satisfy immediate bodily needs can be copyrighted. Despite the dubious
support provided by Burrow-Giles and Holmes’ absolute failure to explain his
conclusion, this Article embraces it nonetheless. To the extent that copyright and
the Copyright Clause address the broader question of human understanding, that
understanding should include works that satisfy intellectual and emotional needs.
But what works satisfy those needs?
Even if the fine arts are equivalent to the useful arts, what is the definition
of fine art? Once again, Justice Holmes’ response is startling in both its simplicity
and its implications. In response to the defendant’s argument that the pictures were
just advertisement and not fine art, Holmes answered, “Certainly works are not the
less connected with the fine arts because their pictorial quality attracts the crowd .
. . . A picture is none the less a picture, and none the less a subject of copyright.”81
In other words, as long as the work falls within the category of works protected by
copyright, such as a book, photograph, sound recording, or audiovisual recording,
the content of those works is irrelevant. If the useful arts include the fine arts, the
fine arts include the frivolous. It is the medium, and not the message, that justifies
copyright protection. After Bleistein, copyright is now undisputedly content
neutral.
In defense of the non-discrimination principle, the opinion provides a
justification that is simultaneously populist and elitist. Justice Holmes argued that
[i]t would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only
to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of
pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most
obvious limits. At the one extreme, some works of genius
would be sure to miss appreciation. Their very novelty would
make them repulsive until the public had learned the new
language in which their author spoke . . . . At the other end,
copyright would be denied to pictures which appealed to a
public less educated than the judge. Yet if they command the
interest of any public, . . . —it would be bold to say that they
have not an aesthetic and educational value,— and the taste of
any public is not to be treated with contempt. 82
In other words, copyright protects works that some might consider “highbrow”
and “lowbrow.” This is justified in part because sometimes we will mistake
treasure as trash, but also because one man’s trash is another man’s treasure. And
judges are not immune from either myopia or bias. As such, Justice Holmes uses
the subjectivity of art as both a descriptive and normative argument to reject the
contention that the Constitution requires courts to define fine art. While fine art
may not defy definition, attempting such a definition “is a dangerous undertaking
for persons trained only in the law,”83 and impermissibly elitist. Thanks to
understanding of science).
80
Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 249.
81 Id. at 251.
82 Id. at 251-52. This Article leaves out Justice Holmes’s reference to commercial value. While I agree
with Beebe that the emphasis on commercial value has been misplaced, Justice Holmes’s opinion does
not rely as heavily upon the idea of commercial value as some may suggest. See generally Beebe, supra
note 18 (critiquing Holmes’s reference to commercial value and arguing against an interpretation of
progress focusing upon commercial value).
83 Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251; see also Brian L. Frye, Aesthetic Nondiscrimination & Fair Use, 3 Belmont
L. Rev. 29, 35 (2016) (“If judges were to consider the aesthetic value of a work in determining whether
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Bleistein, copyright protects trash and treasure and everything in between, and
copyright cannot judge either.
In light of the preceding discussion, this result is breathtaking. Of course,
the importance of establishing the principle of non-discrimination, as Bleistein is
commonly understood, cannot be overstated. Likewise, any faults in Justice
Holmes’ opinion may be excused as the decision has withstood the far more
demanding test of time. Nonetheless, in this discussion, Justice Holmes’ opinion
in Bleistein is also noteworthy because of why he articulated the principle. The
non-discrimination principle was not derived from the text of the Constitution,
which makes explicit reference to science and the useful arts. Nor was it attempting
to conform to the original understanding of the Constitution. By extending
copyright to both works of fine art and works of entertainment, Bleistein rejected
both the early-American and turn-of-the-20th-century understanding of the
Copyright Clause. Instead, the decision put an end to any argument that copyright
must be limited only to science and the useful arts, and did so by convincing
readers to ignore the text of the Constitution.
A close analysis of both Sony and Bleistein reveals that the decisions
stand for much more than what is commonly understood. They stand for the
fundamental proposition that all expression is valuable, and reject the proposition
that copyright allows judges to discriminate against works of low value.
Expression has value to both speaker and audience alike. Moreover, as the
preceding discussion demonstrates, there have always been those that have
questioned the value of entertainment and its place in the copyright pantheon.
Nonetheless, in both Sony and Bleistein, the Supreme Court concluded that
science, history, art, literature, and, yes, entertainment are all equals. As the
remainder of this Article demonstrates, copyright’s non-discrimination principle
plays more than just an important role in copyright; it is also a crucial First
Amendment safeguard against content discrimination. By protecting all
expression, including what some may consider frivolous or trash, Bleistein
anticipated the Supreme Court’s extension of First Amendment protection to foul
and offensive speech. When Supreme Court famously upheld a defendant’s
freedom to say, “Fuck the Draft,”84 it rejected the argument that Cohen could have
conveyed his message in a more refined manner. Echoing Bleistein, the Supreme
Court responded that “one man’s vulgarity may be another’s lyric.”85 By following
the non-discrimination principle, Sony is consistent with both decisions, even if
the majority opinion does so only implicitly. In essence, the Supreme Court’s
response to “Who cares about Honey Boo Boo?” and “What’s the big deal? It’s
just entertainment,” is “Who are we to judge?”
III. “It’s Just Entertainment”
As the rhetorical question, “What’s the big deal? It’s just entertainment,” implies,
discrimination against entertainment remains alive and well. Under these
circumstances, discrimination occurs when courts determine the scope of
copyright protection for entertainment, and not whether those works should be the
subject of copyright. In other words, while copyright protects “trash,” it denies
new authors of “trash” the same freedom as others. Of course, this is a big deal for
it is protected by copyright, their own subjective preferences could prevent them from recognizing both
the objective aesthetic value of the work and its subjective aesthetic value to others.”).
84 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971).
85 Id. at 25.
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these new authors and for the audiences that would enjoy those works.
Nonetheless, through the two most important doctrines in copyright law, the
idea/expression distinction and fair use, once again, courts have claimed the power
to determine whether expression is trash or treasure. Both doctrines are crucial
because they determine the boundaries of a copyright owner’s rights and when and
how subsequent authors may express themselves without fear of copyright
liability. The idea/expression distinction initially determines how far copyright
protects a work beyond literal reproduction. The fair use doctrine then establishes
internal limits to this protection when its literal applications would conflict with
copyright’s underlying purpose of promoting creativity. Under these doctrines,
courts have created a double standard: one for entertainment, and one for
everything else. This double standard results in asymmetric copyright protection
for works of entertainment that privileges existing copyright holders at the expense
of new creative artists.
Before discussing how these doctrines have been interpreted to
discriminate against entertainment, consider the three following scenarios. 1) A
researcher, whether she is an historian, scientist, or law professor, writes a book
by copying (with attribution) a prior work’s topic, thesis, and organization in detail
in an effort to explain and analyze the same problem. 2) A fan of a television show
writes a trivia book based upon the characters and events of the show. 3) A selfproclaimed appropriation artist uses exact reproductions of another artist’s work
as the centerpiece of his own work. In each of these cases, the author is clearly
copying from another. In each case, the copying is extensive. In each case, the
author is not relying solely upon the prior work, but adds their own creativity to
produce a new work. In examples one and two, the authors are not copying
expression but ideas, and in the third example, the author is copying without
reference to the ideas and expression of the original artist. In each of these cases,
whether the author’s new work is considered infringing depends upon the
application of idea/expression distinction and the doctrine of fair use, and as the
following argues, the conclusion depends almost entirely upon whether the
purpose of the new work is “just entertainment.”
A. The Idea/Expression Distinction
Based upon the principle that copyright protects an author’s writing, the
idea/expression distinction limits copyright protection to an author’s expression
and not the ideas conveyed by the expression.86 According to the Supreme Court
in Baker v Selden, “[t]he very object of publishing a book on science or the useful
arts is to communicate to the world the useful knowledge which it contains. But
this object would be frustrated if the knowledge could not be used without
incurring the guilt of piracy of the book.”87 The distinction recognizes the
importance of allowing others to copy and borrow from an existing work, and
See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1879) (“[T]here is a clear distinction between the book as such
and the [subject matter] which it is intended to illustrate.”). In Baker, the Supreme Court was concerned
that the plaintiff was attempting to use copyright to protect rights that should otherwise considered under
patent law. Id. at 102-03. In addition to the idea/expression distinction, the merger doctrine and scenes
a faire deny copyright protection when there are a very limited number of ways of expressing an idea.
See Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix Control Sys., Inc., 886 F.2d 1173, 1175 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Where
an idea and the expression ‘merge,’ or are ‘inseparable,’ the expression is not given copyright protection
. . . . In addition, where an expression is, as a practical matter, indispensable, or at least standard, in the
treatment of a given idea, the expression is protected only against verbatim, or virtually identical
copying.”).
87 Baker, 101 U.S. at 103.
86
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protects the creative process by limiting what an author can protect in the first
instance. Put differently, “[t]he ‘promotion of science and the useful arts’ requires
this limit on the scope of an author's control. Were an author able to prevent
subsequent authors from using concepts, ideas, or facts contained in his or her
work, the creative process would wither.” 88 At its most basic level, this means that
copyright protects authors from piracy—the verbatim reproduction of their literary
form or physical form whether the literary form is text, musical annotation, images
or sound, and no matter whether the physical form is a manuscript, sheet music,
photograph, or digital recording.89
It does not give authors the power to prevent others from drawing from
and using the information, knowledge, and ideas contained in their work. 90 J.K.
Rowling can no more prevent others from writing about a school for witches and
wizards than Albert Einstein can prevent others from using his theory that energy
is equal to the mass of an object multiplied by the speech of light squared.
However, copyright law prevents more than verbatim reproduction: a subsequent
author may violate the right of reproduction by copying non-literal elements of the
work or violate the derivative work right by creating a new work based upon and
transforming, recasting, or adapting the original work. 91 In other words, copyright
currently protects some of degree of expression beyond the literal text. On its face,
the idea/expression distinction is content neutral. In practice, however, courts rely
upon two different definitions for “ideas” based upon their subjective
understanding of the relative worth of the subject matter copied.
Consider the first scenario, a researcher adopting the theory of another.
In Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Hoehling published the book, Who
Destroyed the Hindenburg?92 In that book, he postulated that the Hindenburg was
sabotaged by a member of the crew, Eric Spehl, to please his girlfriend and
“explod[e] the myth of Nazi invincibility.”93 Subsequently, another author, having
consulted Hoehling’s book, not only wrote his own account of the disaster
adopting Hoehling’s theory, but also sold the motion picture rights to Universal
City Studios.94 In turn, Universal City Studios created a motion picture using the
theory as part of its depiction of the disaster.95 At the outset, the court noted:
[T]he protection afforded the copyright holder has never
extended to history, be it documented fact or explanatory
hypothesis. The rationale for this doctrine is that the cause of
knowledge is best served when history is the common property
of all, and each generation remains free to draw upon the
discoveries and insights of the past. Accordingly, the scope of
copyright in historical accounts is narrow indeed, embracing no
more than the author's original expression of particular facts
and theories already in the public domain. As the case before
us illustrates, absent wholesale usurpation of another’s
expression, claims of copyright infringement where works of
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Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 582 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 581-82.
Id.
91 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012); 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
92
618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1980).
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Id. at 975.
94 Id. at 975-76.
95 Id. at 976.
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history are at issue are rarely successful.96
Hoehling did not dispute the existence of the idea/expression distinction, but
argued that because the actual events that led to the Hindenburg disaster were not
known at the time (and remain unknown); his conclusion that Spehl sabotaged the
airship was more like a story plot based upon his selection and interpretation of
facts.97 Nevertheless, the court concluded
the hypothesis that Eric Spehl destroyed the Hindenburg is
based entirely on the interpretation of historical facts, including
Spehl’s life, his girlfriend's anti-Nazi connections, the
explosion's origin in Gas Cell 4, Spehl’s duty station, discovery
of a dry-cell battery among the wreckage, and rumors about
Spehl’s involvement dating from a 1938 Gestapo investigation.
Such an historical interpretation, whether or not it originated
with Mr. Hoehling, is not protected by his copyright and can be
freely used by subsequent authors. 98
According to the court, this limited copyright protection was justified: “[t]o avoid
a chilling effect on authors who contemplate tackling an historical issue or event,
broad latitude must be granted to subsequent authors who make use of historical
subject matter, including theories or plots.”99 In other words, because Hoehling’s
opinions were of the right kind for society, they were the wrong kind for greater
copyright protection. Instead, Hoehling was only entitled to prevent others from
“verbatim reproduction” or bodily appropriating his expression.100 As the
preceding illustrates, the idea/expression distinction can draw a very clear line
between ideas and expression. However as illustrated by the following discussion
of scenario two, the line between ideas and expression is far less generous to new
authors when the topic is not history but entertainment.
Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publishing Group illustrates
how courts interpret the idea/expression distinction under the second scenario
when a fan of a work of fiction creates a work of their own based upon non-literal
elements of the original. 101 In Castle Rock, the defendants published the Seinfeld
Aptitude Test (SAT).102 The SAT presented readers with trivia questions based
upon episodes of the Seinfeld television series. 103 These questions tested the
reader’s knowledge of characters and events that took place in the various
episodes.104 The defendants argued that the SAT did not infringe the television
show because the SAT copied only facts about the show.105 In other words, the
SAT did not copy the expression of Seinfeld such as video footage, images, or the
script. Instead, the book tested the reader’s understanding and ability to recall the
characters and events that took place in the show. In rejecting this argument, the
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Id. at 974.
Id. at 977-78.
98
Id. at 978-79.
99 Id. at 978.
100 Id. at 980. If Hoehling’s account was written as fiction rather than history, Universal would arguably
have infringed his copyright by using his plot without permission.
101 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998).
102
Id. at 135.
103
Id.
104 Id.
105 Castle Rock Entm’t. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 955 F. Supp. 260, 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
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court argued that there are facts and there are facts.106 The court distinguished
between the copying of “true facts” such as those in a telephone book or the
“identity of the actors . . . , the number of days it took to shoot the episode . . . ,
the location of the Seinfeld set, etc.,”107 and “creative” facts.108 Under this
reasoning, the idea/expression distinction did not protect the creator of the SAT
because she did not test whether the reader knows the name of the actress that
portrayed Elaine:
Rather, the SAT tests whether the reader knows that the
character Jerry places a Pez dispenser on Elaine's leg during a
piano recital, that Kramer enjoys going to the airport because
he's hypnotized by the baggage carousels, and that Jerry,
opining on how to identify a virgin, said "It's not like spotting
a toupee." Because these characters and events spring from the
imagination of Seinfeld's authors, the SAT plainly copies
copyrightable, creative expression.109
As such, the court distinguished not only between expression and ideas but
recognized different categories of facts and ideas as well. The events and
characters from a work of fiction, while facts in the literal sense, are not treated as
facts for the idea/expression distinction. Instead, they are considered expression.
As explained in a different case, this distinction is justified based upon a
cost-benefit analysis similar to that in Hoehling. According to the Second Circuit,
there is a difference between “ideas that undertake to advance the understanding
of phenomena or the solution of problems . . . and those . . . that do not undertake
to explain phenomena or furnish solutions, but are infused with the author's taste
or opinion.”110 Moreover, this difference justifies greater freedom to copy from the
former. In other words, courts have determined that it is important that individuals
be free to copy from works “directed to understanding,” but not from those
representing an author’s “taste or opinion.” This double standard is justified
because the latter “do not materially assist the understanding of future thinkers.”111
As such, lower courts unabashedly apply separate standards based upon the
content of the speech, and in doing so, judge the relative importance of those
works.
Initially, this approach is problematic because it is not clear how one
determines whether a work attempts to understand phenomena or provide
solutions to problems and, therefore, is more important for society to copy, as
opposed to a work of taste and opinion. Such an evaluation is fraught with
ambiguity and subjectivity. Is reality television a matter of taste or opinion or is it
a way to understand the human condition and human behavior? Is the podcast
Hidden Brain a means of understanding human decision-making or a series of
stories to entertain someone during their drive to work? As discussed above, both
Bleistein and Sony concluded that these are not distinctions that should be made
106

Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 137-39.
Id. at 139.
See Jeanne Fromer, An Information Theory of Copyright Law, 64 Emory L.J. 71, 100 (2010)
(suggesting that protecting “creative” facts may be inconsistent with information theory).
109 Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 139.
110
CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reps., Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 71 (2d Cir. 1994). See
generally James Grimmelmann, Three Theories of Copyright in Ratings, 14 Vand. J. of Ent. & Tech.
Law 851 (2012) (discussing CCC and other cases copyrighting ratings and valuations).
111 CCC, 44 F.3d at 71.
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by the law.
The effort to differentiate between ideas that promote understanding and those
representing taste and opinion is also problematic because of how it is
implemented. As discussed earlier, the stated purpose of copyright law is to
promote the progress of science or, in other words, to promote human
understanding and education. Assuming that it is both possible and appropriate to
determine what constitutes the work of “future thinkers,” when expression
“materially assists” those thinkers, the courts rather perversely provide the works
closest to the constitutional purpose with the least amount of protection. Assume
we all agree that a paper seeking to understand the relationship between genetics
and cancer promotes the progress of science. Because this is an important subject
and an endeavor at the core of copyright’s purpose, we guarantee future thinkers
freedom to pursue their expression at the expense of past thinkers. In contrast, if
we assume that Honey Boo Boo is not an important subject and an endeavor
furthest from the constitutional purpose for copyright protection, we restrict the
freedom of future entertainers for benefit of the copyright owner of Here Comes
Honey Boo Boo.
If the idea/expression distinction restricts entertainment relative to other
expression, one might expect fair use—the principal defense to copyright
infringement—to provide more breathing room. Unfortunately, fair use also
ignores the non-discrimination principle and imposes greater restrictions on
speech when the author’s purpose is “just entertainment.”
B. The Fair Use Doctrine
If the idea/expression distinction determines when copyright protects against
verbatim copying and when it protects significantly more of an author’s
expression, the fair use doctrine “permits and requires courts to avoid rigid
application of the copyright statute, when . . . it would stifle the very creativity
which that law is designed to foster.”112 In determining whether the copying of a
protected work is fair, the Copyright Act lists four nonexclusive factors for
consideration: the purpose and character of the use, the nature of the copyrighted
work, the amount and substantiality of the portion taken, and the effect of the use
on the potential market.113 More simply, fair use considers the why, what, how,
and the economic consequences of copying. These factors originated with Justice
Story’s opinion in Folsom v. Marsh,114 which is often described as the first fair use
case in the United States.115 However, as scholars have emphasized, Justice Story
used the factors to expand copyright protection at the time rather than as a means
for limiting protection.116 As this section demonstrates, with regard to
entertainment, courts are once again using these factors, not to avoid rigid
application of copyright law, but instead to expand those protections at the expense
of new authors. Because these factors are not weighted equally, the first is
considered far more significant than the second, this section begins briefly with
how expanded protection is clearly achieved with the less weighty second factor the nature of the copyrighted work.
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Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994).
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
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9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
115
L. Ray Patterson, Folsom v. Marsh and its Legacy, 5 J. Intell. Prop. L. 431, 431 (1998).
116 See Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in an Era of Copyright
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The Nature of the Work

The fair use doctrine requires courts to consider the nature of the work
being copied. Because this inquiry focuses upon what is being copied, it tracks the
idea/expression distinction. As such, due to the societal interest in the
dissemination of information, copying from works of science or history is more
likely to be fair.117 In contrast, the copying from works of entertainment is less
likely to be fair because future authors are not the equivalent of future thinkers.
Once again, Castle Rock is a useful example. In determining whether the creation
of a trivia book based upon a television show was fair use, the fictional nature of
the television show weighed heavily against fair use.118 This point is so well
accepted that the defendants conceded “the scope of fair use is somewhat narrower
with respect to fictional works, such as Seinfeld, than to factual works.”119 Much
like the idea/expression cases, the Supreme Court has justified this disparate
treatment based upon the bizarre conclusion that these works are not as important
to society, but, nonetheless, are “closer to the core of intended copyright protection
than others, with [the] consequence that fair use is more difficult to establish.”120
Under these circumstances, one may argue that limiting copying favors
creators of entertainment. After all, it provides such works with greater copyright
protection, and allows creators of entertainment to liberally borrow from history
and other works of science. For example, in Hoehling, not only were other
historians able to base their works upon Hoehling’s, Universal City Studios was
permitted to make a motion picture -- a work of entertainment -- based upon that
same work.121 However, as this Article touched upon earlier, this benefits existing
copyright proprietors of entertainment at the expense of future authors of
entertainment. As the following demonstrates, this asymmetric treatment of
entertainment results from the judgment that creating works of entertainment is
insufficiently valuable.
2.

The Purpose and Character of the Use

The more important and insidious way fair use discriminates against
entertainment is through the first factor, which asks courts to consider “the purpose
and character of the use.”122 This factor is considered one of the most important
factors in fair use, and arguably, should be the most important factor, because it is
the only factor that considers whether any given act of copying is the equivalent
of mechanical reproduction or creative expression in its own right. 123 The
prevention of piracy is the core of copyright protection and preserving the freedom
of new authors to express themselves is the core of fair use. By requiring courts to
consider why the alleged infringer copied, the first factor determines when future
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (“The public interest in
the free flow of information is assured by the law’s refusal to recognize a valid copyright in facts.”).
118 Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., 150 F.3d 132, 143-44 (2d Cir. 1998).
119 Id. at 143.
120
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994).
121 Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 976-77 (2d Cir. 1980).
122 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
123 The fourth factor is often considered an equally if not even more important factor because it considers
the economic harm to authors, and as such, whether a copyright owner is entitled to control that market.
Nevertheless, the first factors serve the corresponding goal of determining whether copying produced a
copy or produced something different. And, as such, the normative question of whether the copyright
owner should control the creation of those works overlaps with what it means to injure the copyright
owner in the market for such works.
117
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authors may copy.
According to the Supreme Court, under the first factor, courts must
determine whether the purpose of the new work is merely to substitute for the
original, “or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or different
character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message.”124 If an
author uses the prior materials for a different purpose or adds something new, the
copying is more likely to be fair.125 Judge Leval, who first articulated what has
become known as the transformative use test, argued that courts should consider
whether the copyrighted work was “used as raw material, transformed in the
creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings”
because such uses qualify as “the very type of activity that the fair use doctrine
intends to protect.”126 While a plagiarist adds “creativity,” their purpose for
copying and resulting expression is still intended as a market substitute for the
original. In contrast, if a new author’s contribution results in a work with a
sufficiently different purpose or is sufficiently “transformative,” the first factor
will not only weigh in favor of fair use, at some point, the work may no longer be
considered a copy at all.127
On its face, the transformative use test suggests that if an author writes a
new screenplay for a sequel to their favorite movie or book, or creates a new set
of maps or an expansion for their favorite video game, the first factor should weigh
in their favor. While the work is based upon another, it does not retell the original
story. Instead, the original is used as raw material for a new story. As this section
demonstrates, when a work is considered a work of entertainment, no amount of
creativity will excuse copying.
In practice, judges interpret the transformative use test to weigh against
fair use when the author’s purpose is “just entertainment.” Initially, supporters of
this approach may point to the Copyright Act’s codification of fair use, in which
entertainment is not listed as an example. Rather, the non-exclusive list includes
“criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research.”128 In
other words, the statute itself discriminates against entertainment. Like the
Supreme Court in Bleistein, courts have rejected such a narrow interpretation, and
rightly so. Instead, they have concluded that
[t]he “ultimate test of fair use . . . is whether the copyright law’s
goal of ‘promoting the Progress of Science and useful Arts’ . .
. would be better served by allowing the use than by preventing
it.”129
124

Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (citations omitted).
Id.
126 Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1105, 1111 (1990).
127 Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Group, 150 F.3d 132, 143 n.9 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Indeed, if
the secondary work sufficiently transforms the expression of the original work such that the two works
cease to be substantially similar, then the secondary work is not a derivative work and, for that matter,
does not infringe the copyright of the original work.”). Rebecca Tushnet cautions that too great an
emphasis on transformative use ignores the importance of simply acts of copying and can undermine the
First Amendment value associated with non-transformative copying. See generally Tushnet, supra note
47. For other criticisms of the transformative use test, see Amy Adler, Fair Use and the Future of Art,
91 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 559, 620 (2016) (arguing for abandoning transformative use and focusing on market
harm instead); Frye, supra note 83, at 47 (arguing that courts should “only ask whether the two works
are different”); Laura A. Heymann, Everything is Transformative: Fair Use and Reader Response, 31
Colum. J.L. & Arts 445, 448-49 (2008) (arguing that transformative use is best determined from the
perspective of the reader).
128 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
129 Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 705 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 141)
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More specifically, fair use protects “the ability of authors, artists, and the rest of
us to express [the works of others]—or ourselves by reference to the works of
others.”130 As such, there is no clear or definitive doctrinal reason to discriminate
against expression when the purpose of that expression is to entertain. Moreover,
as demonstrated in Part II.B., this is specifically prohibited by Bleistein.
Consider Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, the principal Supreme Court
decision addressing whether one work of entertainment may fairly copy another
as a means of parody.131 2 Live Crew wrote and recorded, “Pretty Woman,” a song
that copied extensively from Roy Orbison’s “Oh, Pretty Woman.” 132 2 Live Crew
copied Orbison’s song so extensively, they originally sought and ultimately
obtained a license from Acuff-Rose which owns the copyright to Orbison’s
song.133 The court of appeals concluded that the parody was not fair use because it
was for profit and because it took the heart of the original. 134 In reaching the
conclusion that 2 Live Crew’s song may be fair use, the Supreme Court first
concluded that parodies are sufficiently transformative to satisfy the first fair use
factor.135 According to the Court, parodies “provide social benefit, by shedding
light on an earlier work, and in the process, creating a new one.”136 And, just as
importantly, copying is necessary to provide this social benefit.137
Under Campbell, the key is commentary, not creativity. 138 If the new
work does not comment upon what it copies, it is not likely to be considered
transformative, no matter how much creativity is added. The inquiry is not whether
a particular use is sufficiently creative to transform a work into something new.
Rather, it is more accurate to describe the Supreme Court’s decision as concluding
that copying for the purpose of parody is a means to a legitimate end.139 Copying
for purposes of commenting on the original is legitimate, whereas copying “to get
attention or to avoid the drudgery of working up something fresh” is not. 140 To
make this clear, the Supreme Court compared parody to satire, and questioned the
legitimacy of copying for purposes of satire because “satire can stand on its own
two feet and so requires justification for the very act of borrowing.” 141 Even though
both involve creativity and humor, authors of satire must explain why their
copying represents more than an effort “to get attention.”142 Following this line of
reasoning, the Ninth Circuit upheld an injunction prohibiting the distribution of
The Cat NOT in the Hat! A Parody in which the author mimicked Dr. Seuss’ style
to tell the story of the OJ Simpson murder trial.143 The court concluded that there

(alteration in original).
130 Id. at 705 (quoting Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 250 (2d Cir. 2006)).
131 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
132 Id. at 572-73.
133 Id. at 572.
134 Id. at 573-74.
135 Id. at 579.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 580 (“[T]he heart of any parodist's claim to quote from existing material, is the use of some
elements of a prior author's composition to create a new one that, at least in part, comments on that
author's works.”).
138 Id. at 580-81.
139 Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 215 (2d Cir. 2015) (“[T]he would-be fair user of
another’s work must have justification for the taking.”).
140 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580. This language is particularly ironic from writers who largely quote and
paraphrase the works of others.
141
Id. at 581.
142 Id. at 580-81.
143 Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1396 (9th Cir. 1997).
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was no new expression, meaning, or message because “[t]he stanzas have ‘no
critical bearing on the substance or style of’ The Cat in the Hat.”144 As such, aside
from specifically commenting upon the work in question, it is not clear what, if
any, entertainment-related use would satisfy the first factor.145
Consider Castle Rock once again. There was no question that Beth Golub
authored the SAT, that she used Seinfeld as the raw material for her trivia questions
and answers, and Castle Rock did not have a trivia book of its own.146 There was
also no evidence that the SAT harmed the profitability or diminished the audience
of the television series or any other existing Seinfeld works.147 Despite the fact that
the SAT was a new work, the court considered Golub’s creative contributions to
be “slight to non-existent.”148 The court reached this conclusion for two reasons.
First, the court considered the writing involved to require only minimal creativity.
To support this conclusion the court wrote,
In the time it took to write this last sentence, for example, one
could have easily created the following trivia question about
the film trilogy Star Wars: “Luke Skywalker was aghast to
learn that Darth Vader was Luke’s (a) father (b) father-in-law
(c) best friend (d) Jerry Seinfeld,” and innumerable other such
trivia questions about original creative works.149
In other words, the court judged the creativity of Golub’s contributions, and found
it wanting. As just discussed, this is an unfortunate byproduct of the transformative
use test which can ask whether copying was a means “to get attention or to avoid
. . . working up something fresh.”150 According to the court, trivia questions,
requiring so little creativity, represent nothing more than a “repackag[ing]” of the
Seinfeld television series.151
Moreover, in addition to dismissing Golub’s creative contribution, the
court considered her purpose illegitimate.152 According to the court, copying
creative facts to create trivia questions for a trivia book does not satisfy the purpose
prong for fair use.153 Testing trivia is not criticism, commentary, or parody, and
the SAT could not be reasonably considered educational.154 Instead, the SAT was
just entertainment.155 If Golub engaged in a scholarly analysis of Seinfeld, parodied
the series, or used the show as part of an art exhibition on “nothingness,” her work
may have been fair – not because it would then be sufficiently creative but because
its purpose would not be entertainment.156 Under these circumstances, courts
144

Id. at 1401 (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580).
When read in tandem with the fourth fair use factor consideration of market harm, legitimate reasons
for copying do not include those purposes that a copyright owner “would in general develop or license.”
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592. Yet, according to the Court, “[T]he unlikelihood that creators of imaginative
works will license critical reviews or lampoons of their own productions removes such uses from the
very notion of a potential licensing market.” Id.
146 Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Group, 150 F.3d 132, 135-36 (2d Cir. 1998).
147 Id. at 136.
148 Id. at 142.
149
Id. at 143 n.8.
150 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580.
151 Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 142.
152 Id. at 143.
153 Id.
154
Id.
155
Id. (“The SAT’s plain purpose . . . is not to expose Seinfeld’s ‘nothingness,’ but to satiate Seinfeld
fans’ passion for the ‘nothingness’ . . . .”).
156 See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 698 (2d Cir. 2013); Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 252 (2d Cir.
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should not express any opinion with respect to the creative choices of the allegedly
infringing authors, let alone diminish their creative efforts. Under the first factors,
courts are determining whether the author’s reasons for copying – to write a sequel,
engage in satire, or write a trivia book – are sufficiently different than the reasons
a copyright owner may have had for creating such a work in the first place. More
precisely, they are concluding that the only legitimate reason for copying is for the
creation of works that the copyright holder would never willingly create.
Compare the result and reasoning in Castle Rock with two subsequent
decisions from the same circuit. The first, Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc. v.
RDR Books, is closely analogous to Castle Rock as it involved extensive copying
of “creative facts.” 157 In the second, Cariou v. Prince, the alleged infringer does
more than copy creative facts; he uses exact copies of the original works with no
pretense of commenting upon the originals. 158 Nevertheless, in both cases, the
courts concluded that the copying was legitimate because the purposes were for
more than just entertainment.159
In Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc. v. RDR Books, Steven Vander Ark,
a fan of J.K Rowling’s Harry Potter series, created “The Harry Potter Lexicon.”160
The district court described his reasons for creating the Lexicon as follows: “His
purpose in establishing the website was to create an encyclopedia that collected
and organized information from the Harry Potter books in one central source for
fans to use for reference.”161 The Lexicon described, among other things, the
spells, characters, creatures, places, and events from the series and served as an AZ, a reference for all of the creative facts from J.K. Rowling’s stories.162 Vander
Ark’s work was so good that Rowling herself admitted to using it when creating
later works in the series.163
Knowing that Rowling was interested in publishing a Harry Potter
encyclopedia of her own, Vander Ark initially hesitated to expand beyond the
website.164 Ultimately, RDR Books convinced him to publish his own book based
upon the website, and the copyright litigation ensued.165 Rowling and Warner
Bros. argued that the Lexicon violated their rights of reproduction and derivative
work rights.166 Because the Lexicon made extensive use of verbatim quotes from
Rowling’s works, the court concluded that plaintiffs had established a prima facie
case of infringement of the right of reproduction in those works.167 However, more
importantly for this discussion, the court concluded that Rowling could not prevent
him from using her work for his intended purpose.168 According to the court, the
Lexicon was not a derivative work. The court reached this conclusion even though,
like the SAT, the Lexicon was entirely based upon Rowling’s creative facts, which

2006); Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 607 (2d Cir. 2006); cf. Warner
Bros. Entm’t, Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (concluding that a guide
to the Harry Potter universe was not a derivative work because the guide had a different purpose than
the original).
157 575 F. Supp.2d 513 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
158 Cariou, 714 F.3d at 704.
159 Id. at 708; RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d at 539.
160
RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d at 520.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 521.
164 Id. at 522.
165
Id. at 522-23.
166
Id. at 538-39.
167 Id. at 538.
168 Id. at 538-39.
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she described as “plundering all of the ‘plums in [her] cake,’”169 and despite having
adopted Castle Rock’s protection of creative facts in its reproduction analysis.170
Instead, the court considered the Lexicon to be so transformative it could
no longer be considered a copy of Harry Potter and, as such, was not only a fair
use, but did not fall into the category of works protected under the derivative work
right.171 The court reached this result by concluding that the purpose of the Lexicon
was not a purpose reserved to the copyright owner. 172 According to the court, the
derivative work right only prevents others from recasting, transforming, or
adapting the original.173 In other words, it prevents others from retelling the
original story in another medium.174 Vander Ark did not copy Rowling for the
purpose of telling the stories in the Harry Potter series in another medium. 175
Instead, the purpose of the Lexicon was “to give the reader a ready understanding
of individual elements in the elaborate world of Harry Potter,” and copyright
owners cannot prohibit others from creating such works. 176 Under this approach, a
companion or reference guide providing fans with an understanding of a
copyrighted work serves a sufficiently different and valuable purpose from the
original that it is no longer a copy -- let alone that the copying was fair.177 This is
true even though the work was not intended as a scholarly commentary or analysis
of the series.178 Furthermore, the purpose behind this type of companion work is
sufficiently distinct from a companion that tests the reader’s knowledge of the
Harry Potter series through a series of questions and answers.179 In distinguishing
the Lexicon from the SAT, the court noted that the purpose of the Lexicon was “not
to entertain but to aid the reader.”180
Lastly, consider how one court addressed scenario three and the issue of
fine art. In perhaps one of the most expansive fair use decisions to date, Cariou v.
Prince suggests that creating a new work of fine art is a sufficiently legitimate
purpose to justify even wholesale copying. 181 Patrick Cariou is a photographer who
published a series of photographs of Rastafarians.182 Richard Prince purchased
copies of Cariou’s photographs and then incorporated them into a series of
paintings and collages of his own.183 Prince’s work was then exhibited and
reproduced as part of a catalogue of the exhibition.184 According to the court,
“Prince is a well-known appropriation artist” whose works have been displayed in
art museums around the world including the Guggenheim and the Whitney. 185
Using a definition provided by the Tate Gallery, the opinion defines appropriation
art as “the more or less direct taking over into a work of art a real object or even
an existing work of art.”186 According to Prince, “he ‘completely tr[ies] to change
169

Id. at 526.
Id. at 534-38.
171 Id. at 538 n.17.
172 Id. at 538.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 539.
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 Id. at 542 (discussing the transformative nature of a reference source under fair use).
178
Id. at 543 n.20.
179 Id. at 542.
180 Id.
181 Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 707-08 (2d Cir. 2013).
182 Id. at 698.
183
Id. at 699-700.
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Id. at 699.
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[another artist’s work] into something that’s completely different.’” 187 In one
work, Prince used a series of heads from Cariou’s photographs as part of a collage
with images from other artists.188 In another work, the court noted that Prince did
little more than “paint blue lozenges over the subject’s eyes and mouth, and paste
a picture of a guitar over the subject’s body.” 189 The district court rejected Prince’s
fair use defense, and the Second Circuit reversed.190
Following Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, the district court interpreted fair use
as limited to circumstances in which new authors “in some way comment on, relate
to the historical context of, or critically refer back to the original,” and found
Prince’s works did none of those things. 191 In fact, Prince testified during
deposition that he “do[es]n’t really have a message,” that he was not “trying to
create anything with a new meaning or a new message,” and that he “do[es]n’t
have any . . . interest in [Cariou’s] original intent.”192
In reversing, the Second Circuit concluded “Prince’s work could be
transformative even without commenting on Cariou’s work or on culture, and even
without Prince’s stated intention to do so.”193 Instead, copying is fair use if one
may reasonably perceive that the new work uses the copied work as part of “new
expression, and employ[s] new aesthetics with creative and communicative results
distinct” from the original.194 The court concluded that twenty-five of Prince’s
works clearly satisfied this test and qualified as fair uses as a matter of law because
those works had a “new and different” aesthetic.195
Where Cariou’s serene and deliberately composed portraits and
landscape photographs depict the natural beauty of
Rastafarians and their surrounding environs, Prince’s crude and
jarring works, on the other hand, are hectic and provocative.196
The five remaining works at issue were remanded for further consideration
because the court could not conclude whether they represented a “new expression”
by conveying a “new meaning, or message.” 197
If RDR and Cariou are applied to entertainment, authors of entertainment could
create their own stories with the works of others so long as they do more than tell
the same story or tell the same story in a different medium. The remainder of this
article will refer to this standard as “virtual infringement” or “virtual
appropriation.”198 A fan of Harry Potter would be free to write a story with
Hermione Granger as the protagonist without fear of copyright liability or a need
to justify her decision. In contrast, this approach would prohibit a computer
programmer from recreating the motion picture Harry Potter and the Sorcerer's
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Id.
Id. at 700.
Id. at 700-01.
190 Id. at 712.
191 Id. at 704 (quoting Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 348-49 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)).
192 Id. at 707 (quoting Cariou, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 349).
193
Id. at 707.
194 Id. at 708.
195 Id. at 710-11.
196 Id. at 706.
197 Id. at 711 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)).
198
This test is similar to the concept of thin protection outlined in Hoehling and Feist, which prevents
verbatim or wholesale copying. Virtual infringement—telling the same story or retelling the same story
in a different medium—more accurately captures both the scope of the reproduction right which would
prohibit plagiarism and the derivative work right.
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Stone as computer animation using only ASCII code. While these results would
be consistent with a logical and principled application of what the Second Circuit
considers transformative use, courts are unlikely to apply this standard to
entertainment.
As the preceding discussion illustrates, judges have exhibited both an
implicit and explicit bias against entertainment, and RDR and Cariou are no
exception. Both decisions rely heavily upon Castle Rock, and consider their
outcomes consistent with Castle Rock.199 Neither opinion suggests the need to
distinguish Castle Rock’s holding that creative facts are protected by copyright. In
fact, RDR agreed with this conclusion and applied it with respect to the right of
reproduction.200 Likewise, neither decision questions Castle Rock’s conclusion
that it is not a legitimate purpose to create a new work “to entertain Seinfeld
viewers” or to “satiate Seinfeld fans’ passion for the ‘nothingness’” of Seinfeld.201
The court in RDR even described the arguments that the SAT was transformative
as “specious,”202 and that efforts to profit from the “entertainment value” of a work
weigh against fair use.203 Instead, the Lexicon did more than entertain and “satiate”
Harry Potter fans’ desire for more things Harry Potter.204 The Lexicon aided
readers by providing them with “a ready understanding of the individual elements
in the elaborate world of Harry Potter.”205 And, Cariou distinguished Castle Rock
on the basis that Prince’s work was directed at a different audience than Cariou’s
while the SAT was directed at the same audience as the television series. 206
Because both decisions reject the idea that creating a work of entertainment is a
sufficient justification for copying, it is unlikely that other courts will apply the
virtual appropriation standard beyond the circumstances of those cases.
Moreover, Cariou may well be limited to “fine art.” For example, in
Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, the defendants printed a t-shirt mocking the mayor
of Madison, Wisconsin for attempting to end to an annual block party that he,
himself, once attended.207 The t-shirt design began with a picture of the mayor
taken by Kienitz at the mayor’s inauguration.208 The picture appeared on the City’s
website, and the defendants copied it from there. 209 The image was then digitally
modified, colored green, and surrounded by the phrase “Sorry for Partying” in
multi-colored text.210 Arguably, under Cariou, the defendants’ use would be
considered fair because the image was used as raw material for new expression
with a different aesthetic and meaning. Rather than reproduce a dignified
photograph of the mayor, the t-shirt used the image as an outline for a
Cariou, 714 F.3d at 708; Warner Bros. Entm’t v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 542-43
(S.D.N.Y. 2008).
200 RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d at 536.
201 Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., 150 F.3d 132, 142-43 (2d Cir. 1998).
202 RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d at 542.
203 Id. at 545 (quoting Elvis Presley Enters. v. Passport Video, 349 F.3d 622, 628 (9th Cir. 2003)).
204 Id at 542 (citing Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 142).
205 Id. at 539. Contra Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1372 (2d Cir. 1993)
(concluding that a guidebook to the television series violated the copyright owner’s right to control
derivative works); Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., 11 F. Supp. 2d 329, 335 (S.D.N.Y.
1998) (concluding that the purpose of a Star Trek companion book was not sufficiently different from
the purpose of the television show).
206 Cariou, v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 709 (2d Cir. 2013).
207 Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 757 (7th Cir. 2014). See also Adler, supra note 127,
at 594, 623-24 (arguing for an abandonment of transformative use because works of fine art can be
treated as commodities and rarely involve the creation of reproductions or derivative works).
208
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monochromatic, digital cutout of a political figure and criticized this figure for
hypocrisy. While the court concluded that the use did not infringe Kienitz’s
copyright, it did so primarily because the defendants digitally removed so much
of the original image that no copyrightable elements remained.211
With respect to this discussion, Kienitz is noteworthy for two reasons.
First, the opinion specifically declines to follow Cariou.212 Judge Easterbrook’s
reason for doing so is a skepticism that transformative use, such as the
appropriation art in Cariou, can be considered fair without “extinguishing” the
derivative work right.213 “To say that a new use transforms the work is precisely
to say that it is derivative . . . .”214 To be clear, Judge Parker’s opinion does provide
an explanation. Using the SAT as his example, he states that transforming
another’s work is not fair use, “where the infringer’s target audience and the nature
of the infringing content is the same as the original.” 215 To the extent that Kienitz
declines to follow Cariou, it suggests that Judge Easterbrook considered Cariou’s
conception of fair use too generous, and its definition of derivative works too
narrow. This perspective becomes clearer later in the opinion when the court goes
out of its way to criticize the defendants’ use the photograph.216
Judge Easterbrook’s criticism of the defendants’ creative choices in
Kienitz is the second reason the decision is relevant to this discussion. Despite
having concluded that the defendant’s use of Kienitz’s photograph was a fair use,
the court goes on to sympathize with Kienitz and argues that the defendants “did
not need to use the copyrighted work.”217 According to the court, they were not
commenting on Kienitz or his photo, and there were plenty of “non-copyrighted
alternatives (including snapshots they could have taken themselves).”218 Under
these circumstances, the copying was not fair, but “lazy.” 219 In the Seventh
Circuit’s view, the goal of fair use is not to provide breathing room for all
creativity, but to “facilitate a class of uses that would not be possible if users
always had to negotiate with copyright proprietors.”220 Copying to create a t-shirt,
even to send a political message unrelated to the copyright image, does not fall
into that class.221 If copyrightable elements of the image remained, the opinion
strongly suggests that similar acts of “lazy appropriation” would not be considered
fair use even if they might satisfy Cariou.222
Despite the Supreme Court’s admonishment in Bleistein, copyright law
appears to have come full circle, with judges once again determining what
qualifies as art. Fair use depends upon whether an author copies for what judges
consider to be acceptable purposes, and not upon whether the author has created
something new and different from the original.223 Noticeably absent from the list
Id. at 759 (“Defendants removed so much of the original that, as with the Cheshire Cat, only the
smile remains.”).
212 Id. at 758.
213 Id.
214 Id. See also Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 215 (2d Cir. 2015) (noting the difficulties
created by oversimplification of transformation and its relation to derivative works).
215 Cariou, v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 709 (2d Cir. 2013).
216 Kienitz, 766 F.3d at 759.
217
Id. at 759.
218 Id.
219 Id.
220 Id.
221 Id.
222
Id.
223
Unfortunately, even if an author has a legitimate justification for copying they must still justify what
they copied: a parodist cannot “skim the cream and get away scot free.” Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,
Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 589 (1994) (remanding “to permit evaluation of the amount taken, in light of the
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of legitimate purposes are copying for inspiration, copying as homage, copying as
a point of reference, or copying simply because it strikes the artist as
appropriate.224 When authors incorporate another’s work into their own works, the
copying is transformative in a literal sense as recognized by Cariou. And, copying
for these reasons is not the equivalent of copying to create a substitute for the
original. Instead, fair use only protects works with a distinctly different purpose
than the original, and as Kienetz adds, one that would not otherwise be possible if
the creator had to negotiate with the copyright owner. Entertaining is not one of
these purposes.225
In tandem with the idea/expression distinction, fair use dramatically
restricts the freedom of authors whose works are considered “just entertainment.”
A scholar may rely almost entirely upon another’s work for their topic, thesis, and
organization, and quote extensively from the work in short quotes or block quotes.
As long as the scholar’s work is not the equivalent of wholesale duplication, it is
not infringing even if the scholar’s own creative contribution is slight and may
substitute for the original. While the work may not be considered valuable, and it
may even injure the scholar’s reputation, the scholar is generally assured that they
will not be subject to copyright liability. In contrast, if a musician wishes to capture
the feel of another artist, “quote” from a prior work by including a portion of the
song, perhaps the riff, bass line, or hook, or sample a portion of the recording, the
musician faces a serious risk of a judgment that her work infringes copyright.
Similarly, a filmmaker who loves the look of a poster or even a pinball machine
and wishes to include it in a film risks infringement.226 While these acts of copying
may occasionally be dismissed as de minimis,227 under fair use, authors must
justify their choices, and if the reason for copying is to entertain, courts will most
likely consider those choices wrong and lazy.
As the preceding discussion illustrates, copyright law discriminates
against works of entertainment. The idea/expression distinction dramatically limits
the raw materials available to authors of entertainment, and the fair use doctrine
virtually eliminates all uses of that raw material. Courts have reached these results
by concluding that copying under these circumstances is just “lazy,” a means “to
get attention,” or “to avoid the drudgery in working up something fresh.”
Recognizing this bias against entertainment provides greater clarity to the
idea/expression dichotomy and fair use doctrine, and explains why courts have
concluded that new authors cannot adopt prior authors’ characters, 228 look and

song’s parodic purpose and characters, its transformative elements, and considerations of the potential
for market substitution”).
224 Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 215 (2d Cir. 2015) (“A secondary author is not
necessarily at liberty to make wholesale takings of the original author’s expression merely because of
how well the original author’s expression would convey the secondary author’s different message.”).
225 If the concern is substitution, requiring authors to provide additional justifications is entirely
gratuitous. While there is a genuine concern that copying for legitimate reasons may still result in
substitution, that concern is addressed by the remaining fair use factors. And, those additional factors
are still considered even when courts conclude that the purpose of copying is legitimate. Dismissing
these artistic purposes is the equivalent of adding insult to injury.
226 See Gottlieb Dev. LLC v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 590 F. Supp. 2d 625, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(concluding that the inclusion of a pinball machine in the background of a scene in a motion picture was
fair use).
227 Id. at 632 (quoting Ringgold v. Black Entm’t T.V. Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1997)) (“The legal
maxim ‘de minimis non curat lex’ -- ‘the law does not concern itself with trifles’ -- applies in the
copyright context.”).
228 See Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 754 (9th Cir. 1978); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer,
Inc. v. American Honda Motor Co., 900 F. Supp. 1287, 1296 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
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feel,229 sound,230 or style.231 Likewise, the conclusion that Michael Bolton is just
an entertainer might explain why courts have concluded that a new author may be
subject to copyright liability even when the author is not aware that he is
copying.232 Copyright imposes these restrictions even when new authors are
creative in their own right and when their works communicate a different
message.233 With the exception of the fine arts, copying for the purposes of
entertainment is only fair when the speaker not only copies to tell a different story,
but, for a purpose that is altogether different from the original. Despite Justice
Holmes’ admonishment, courts are once again sorting the useless from the useful
and the frivolous from the fine. And entertainment is once again frivolous.
However, this time, works of entertainment are not being denied protection. To
the contrary. Existing works of entertainment are given the greatest amount of
copyright protection to date. Instead, new authors are denied the freedom to tell
their own stories if their only value is entertainment.
IV. IS THERE A THERE THERE?
While the non-discrimination principle suggests that courts should avoid
becoming the “final judges of the worth” of expression, is there, nonetheless, a
non-discriminatory reason for treating entertainment differently? In other words,
is there a principled distinction between works that “undertake to advance the
understanding of phenomena or the solution of problems,” and those “infused with
the author's taste or opinion” that justifies affording different degrees of freedom
and protection? Even if one begins with the premise that all creative works are
equally valuable, and that works of opinion and entertainment contribute to our
understanding of what it means to be human, it is still possible that the pursuit of
science and entertainment are sufficiently different to justify different treatment.
Even if an action movie about a disaster created by climate change has a greater
impact upon public appreciation of climate change than a peer-reviewed article by
climatologists, there are still differences between a fictional movie and a scholarly
publication. This section explores the argument that inherent differences or
instrumental reasons justify different liability standards for science and
entertainment.234
The strongest argument that can be made in defense of separate standards
is that there are different risks associated with overprotecting different categories
of works.235 Under these circumstances, copyright’s double standard would be
justified based upon the nature of the works rather than a judgment that science
(or fine art) is more important than entertainment. As Judge Boudin described,
229

See Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970).
See Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 853 (9th Cir. 2004).
See Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 706, 712 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
232 See Three Boys Music Corp. v. Michael Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 486 (9th Cir. 2000).
233 For example, if Shakespeare's Romeo and Juliet were still protected by copyright, Arthur Laurents
would have been advised to obtain the copyright owner’s permission before producing West Side Story
or to change the story completely.
234
For the remainder of this Article, “science” is used as the shorthand for all works that may be
considered to advance understanding to provide solutions to problems. In light of Cariou, fine art is
arguably included in that definition. However, attempting to distinguish between fine art and
entertainment directly contradicts the non-discrimination principle. As such, this section does not
attempt to differentiate art from entertainment and will at times use them interchangeably. One may find
as much beauty in a figurine of Yoda as a statue of David.
235
Note that the issue is already framed in biased terms by describing the problem as a danger of overprotecting works or suppressing more expression than necessary rather than as a risk of under-protecting
works.
230
231
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Most of the law of copyright and the “tools” of analysis have
developed in the context of literary works such as novels, plays,
and films. In this milieu, the principal problem . . . is to
stimulate creative expression without unduly limited access by
others to the broader themes and concepts deployed by the
author. The middle of the spectrum presents close cases; but a
“mistake” in providing too much protection involves a small
cost: subsequent authors treating the same themes must take a
few more steps away from the original expression.236
If courts err on the side of overprotecting science, subsequent research may be
chilled. Narrowly interpreting legal restrictions upon future authors reduces this
chilling effect -- a basic principle of First Amendment law. This allows any
number of scholars or researchers to work on the same question or problem. It
allows them to produce works that would otherwise be prohibited for
entertainment because they are substantially similar to a prior work or could be
considered a derivative work. Under these circumstances, copying advances the
goals of copyright, or is at least tolerated as a necessary cost for advancing those
goals.
In contrast, this position suggests that if courts err on the side of
overprotecting entertainment, works of opinion and taste, little is lost. Chilling the
creation of similar works that are “just entertainment” is acceptable because they
do not advance human understanding. Entertainers are not thinkers.237 If
substantial copying is considered inevitable or even desirable when advancing
science, the same is not true for entertainment. Moreover, requiring artists, as
opposed to scholars, to alter their expression comes only at a “small cost.” Some
have even argued that copyright restrictions upon new authors increase and
promote creativity by forcing them to “take a few more steps away” and work
around the original expression.238
A. Intrinsic Differences?
Aside from relying upon the judicial conclusion that science is more important
than entertainment, one can argue that this distinction is justified because factual
and scholarly works are distinctly different.239 Facts are facts, problems need
solving, and phenomena need exploring. There is only one set of historical facts
for a given incident or a given set of circumstances for a specific problem, and
those facts, “do not owe their origin to an act of authorship. The distinction is one
Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 819 (1st Cir. 1995) (Boudin, J., concurring). The
specific facts of Lotus demonstrate another example of differential interpretation of the idea/expression
distinction with respect to computer programs. Much like Baker v. Selden, courts have been reluctant to
expand the right of reproduction beyond literal copying for fear of creating patent-like protection. While
related to the importance of distinguishing between idea and expression, the essay does not address the
effort to distinguish the functional from expression, which is arguably a separate and sui generis issue
created by Congress’s decision to provide copyright protection to computer programs.
237 See CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reps., Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 71 (2d Cir. 1994).
238 For an excellent debate on this topic, see Joseph P. Fishman, Creating Around Copyright, 128 Harv.
L. Rev. 1333 (2015) (arguing in favor of restraint leading to greater creativity); Rebecca Tushnet, Free
to Be You and Me? Copyright and Constraint, 128 Harv. L. Rev. F. 125 (2015) (responding to Fishman);
Dan L. Burk, The “Creating Around” Paradox: Responding to Joseph P. Fishman, Creating and
Copyright, 128 Harv, L. Rev. 1333 (2015), 128 Harv. L. Rev. F. 118 (2015).
239 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 347 (1991).
236
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between creation and discovery: The first person to find and report a particular fact
has not created the fact; he or she has merely discovered its existence.”240
As such, the range of expression is naturally rather than artificially
limited. And, because we want answers (or the truth, even if we cannot handle it),
copyright allows those interested in working on these problems and topics the
freedom to borrow substantially from their predecessors. In the absence of
duplicating a work in its entirety, new authors may copy not only the heart of a
prior work, but also everything of value contributed by their predecessors. There
is no privilege in being the first to provide a given interpretation, proposal, or
solution. As the Supreme Court has stated,
It may seem unfair that much of the fruit of the compiler's labor
may be used by others without compensation. As Justice
Brennan has correctly observed, however, this is not “some
unforeseen byproduct of a statutory scheme.” It is, rather, “the
essence of copyright,” . . . and a constitutional requirement.”241
Under these circumstances, copying and not control is the “means by which
copyright advances the progress of science and art.”242
Consider the Hindenburg. There is only one set of events that led to the
destruction of the Hindenburg. As such, there are a finite number of explanations
and interpretations of those facts. For historians working on the Hindenburg
disaster, there are only so many possible explanations for why the airship caught
fire. Spehl was a crewmember. He had a lady friend who was a suspected
communist, so it is quite plausible that he did it and did it for her. Under copyright
law, Hoehling may have been the first to put those pieces together, but that does
not allow him to preclude others from adopting his description of events as their
own, even without attributing it to Hoehling.243 As the Supreme Court stated in
Feist, allowing others to copy is one of the ways in which copyright advances
human understanding.244
In contrast, consider a visual artist, whether painter, photographer, or
graphic artist. One could argue that visual artists work with a virtually unlimited
number of creative facts. They have an unlimited number of subjects to choose
from and a wide variety of options for composing and capturing those subjects,
including whether to use paint, camera, or computers. Because of the virtually
infinite variations, one could argue that copyright prohibits a photographer from
photographing a similar subject with similar choices for capturing and composing
the photograph.245 This is true even when there is no dispute that the photographer
captured their own photograph or a painter painted their own painting rather than
“slavishly” duplicating the original.246 Instead, the visual artist is told to work
around the first artist’s work for no other reason than that the original artist put
those elements together first.

240

Id.
Id. at 349 (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 589 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting)).
242 Id.
243 While attribution may be required as a matter of academic ethics or if recognized as a moral right,
copyright does not require attribution. See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S.
23 (2003).
244
Feist, 499 U.S. at 350.
245 See Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 457-61 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
246 Id.
241
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Metaphysics aside, there is a difference between answering problems and
expressing one’s tastes. Facts are discovered and not created. But aside from
stating a truism, this does not adequately explain the different tolerance thresholds
for copying. We may want multiple authors to explore the same specific topic or
phenomenon, but there is no inherent value in multiple authors producing the same
work. What is the intrinsic value of having a subsequent historian, economist, or
law professor repeat the exact same thesis, organization, and conclusion of
another?
It is at this point that the “facts are different” argument conflates
conclusions with expression. It fails to distinguish between the results of the two
creative endeavors and the means of producing those results. In other words, when
answering problems or providing solutions, it is inevitable and even desirable for
multiple authors to reach the same conclusion or result. Reporters researching an
event should discover the same facts. Was Spehl the saboteur? Did Russians
interfere in the 2016 U.S. Presidential election, and if so, how? Applying the
scientific method, scientists should, likewise, reach the same conclusions and their
work should produce the same results. For example, vaccinations do not cause
autism, and humans are significant contributors to climate change.
In contrast, in entertainment, there are no separate conclusions to be
reached. As an expression of taste and opinion, the conclusion of the creative
process, the result, is the work itself. When entertainers reach the same creative
conclusion, they have created the same expression. For example, two poets may
well conclude that an aspect of love is best expressed with, “A rose by any other
name would smell as sweet.” Two screenwriters may also decide that heroism and
the struggle between good and evil is best expressed as a struggle between monks
wielding mystical powers and laser swords. Because there are virtually an infinite
number of ways to express the fanciful, independently creating the exact same
work while possible, is not inevitable.247
However, while works of science may reach the same conclusion, it is
not inevitable nor desirable for subsequent authors to simply repeat what others
have said before. Take research in the experimental sciences, for example, which
arguably has the strongest case for “repetition.” If one researcher publishes an
article arriving at a certain result, other researchers must be able to replicate that
result, and they must do so by precisely following the prior work. While one might
describe the work of these subsequent researchers as copying, they are
fundamentally doing and contributing something new. By repeating experiments
and then publishing their methods, results, and conclusions, subsequent authors
are testing the validity of the original research. The resulting publications are not
repeating the work of the original, they are original contributions of their own.
Under these circumstances, the value is not repetition, but validation.248
Likewise, it may be desirable for multiple historians to research and
publish on the exact same event in history, like the Hindenburg disaster. Because
the disaster is historical fact, multiple, if not all authors, examining the topic may
247

The infinite monkey theorem postulates that an infinite number of monkeys typing at keyboards for
an infinite amount of time will reproduce the works of Shakespeare.
248 The same can be said for journalism. While there is clearly a value in spreading news and information,
there is even more value when subsequent reports corroborate the initial reporting. Because of a failure
to appreciate this form of “copying,” there is currently what some have described as a “replication crisis”
in science in which a significant number of findings are not or cannot be replicated. See Ed Yong,
Psychology’s Replication Crisis is Running out of Excuses, The Atlantic (Nov. 19, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2018/11/psychologys-replication-crisis-real/576223/. This
crisis is driven in part by publications favoring “new original” contributions over replication studies.
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reach the same conclusion. Yet, this is not the same as repeating and duplicating
the work of prior historians to express the same conclusions that the prior
researchers reached. It is quite the opposite because the study of facts, like the
study of chemistry, only advances when historians make independent
contributions of their own. This contribution could be made by adopting a new
approach or perspective, contributing new information or insight, or, like the
experimental example, simply confirming the work of prior historians. These
contributions do not need to be dramatic or paradigm-shifting. The advancement
of knowledge is often incremental. Nevertheless, while history is factual and
authors do not create those facts, simply repeating another’s expression does not
advance our understanding of history.
Similarly, there is no inherent reason why science cannot provide more
creative and innovative solutions if authors were required to take a few more steps
away and work around prior authors.249 Once again, there is no benefit to society
when two, let alone two hundred law review articles address the same copyright
problem in substantially the same manner to reach the same conclusion especially
if this is achieved by copying from a single source. Under these circumstances,
one could argue that society would be better served if copyright, in addition to
social and professional norms, required subsequent authors to make more than
incremental contributions, but rather to make a significant or substantial
contribution to the field.
Unless a subsequent researcher discovers some new fact, there appears
to be little to no value in having multiple authors making the same claim that Spehl
sabotaged the Hindenburg for his girlfriend. For example, why should subsequent
historians write about the Spehl hypothesis? Is this the inevitable and natural result
of history? Wouldn’t society be better off if new authors were required to come up
with their own hypotheses, or to write something that no one else has written
before? Even if a historian wants to write about the Hindenburg, there is a
significant, if not limitless, number of topics and perspectives that they may adopt.
What role did the Hindenburg play in Nazi propaganda? What role did the disaster
play in the decline in lighter-than-air travel? Likewise, if historians after Hoehling
want to write about Spehl as saboteur, they could at least be required to provide
independent research confirming or disputing his account. As such, restricting
copying could encourage historians to contribute more to the study of history. Is
the cost to the historian appreciably different, let alone greater, than the cost to a
songwriter? In other words, the same arguments made for the creative costs and
benefits of restricting works of entertainment can be made with equal force for
restricting works of science. So while there is a very real difference between fact
and fiction, between evidence and opinion, there is no inherent reason copyright
should treat those works differently. As the Supreme Court has recognized, facts
themselves may not be original, but the way an author puts together and expresses
those facts is original.250
B. Instrumental Differences?
If there is no intrinsic difference between the factual and the frivolous
that justifies a double standard, is there an instrumental justification? More
249

This is a fundamental aspect of patent law. See, e.g., F.M. Scherer & David Ross, Industrial Market
Structure and Economic Performance 624-26 (3d ed. 1990) (discussing designing around patent claims);
Burk, supra note 238.
250 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1991).
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specifically, without judging the relative merits of the two, are there instrumental
reasons for tolerating copying when creating works of science but not when
creating entertainment? As discussed above, the principal justification for
prohibiting only virtual appropriation is preventing copyright liability from
chilling creativity and expression. With respect to science, the law tolerates
copying that results in little or no contribution, because more rigorous protection
could discourage new contributions. If, as discussed above, authors in science
could be forced to be more creative if subject to greater copyright liability, what
are we afraid of chilling? As the following argues, limiting copyright protection
for works of science protects: (1) copying as a fundamental part of the learning
and creative process; (2) incremental contributions that may not be recognized or
appreciated as such; and (3) works that may not say anything new, but may say it
better.251 Limiting copyright protection to virtual infringement creates breathing
space for all three. It recognizes what Marcel Proust once said,
The only true voyage of discovery, the only fountain of Eternal
Youth, would be not to visit strange lands but to possess other
eyes, to behold the universe through the eyes of another, of a
hundred others, to behold the hundred universes that each of
them beholds, that each of them is.252
The first potential justification for tolerating extensive copying is that
copying is integral to the learning and creative process that enables subsequent
authors to contribute new works of their own. For example, short of fraudulently
passing off someone else’s work as one’s own, using someone else’s ideas and
expression is fundamentally part of learning and developing one’s own expertise.
By copying earlier ideas and earlier expression, new authors study both the form
and substance of their chosen subjects. Copying makes it possible for students to
build upon, and -- every teacher’s dream or nightmare -- effectively critique those
that came before them. Limited copyright protection facilitates this process by
allowing authors to draw freely from existing work, both privately and publicly,
as building blocks for their own work.253
Second, limited copyright protection may be justified because society,
especially those trained in the law, may not appreciate or immediately recognize
that something new is being contributed. Justice Holmes made this point about
appreciation in Bleistein:
At the one extreme, some works of genius would be sure to

251

See generally Fromer, supra note 108, at 84 (using information theory to explain the importance of
examining copyright questions through the lens of information theory). Fromer suggests that:
For one thing, encoding the knowledge copyright law seeks to encourage in
redundant forms will help to transcend noisy expression and accomplish
copyright law’s goals of creating, disseminating, and preserving this knowledge.
For another, encouraging expression that is valued in and of itself to be used and
reused in multiple contexts will help provide important multiple meanings for
this expression to different audiences in varied contexts.
Id.
252 Marcel Proust, Remembrance of Things Past, Vol. 5 The Prisoner, ch. 2 (C.K. Moncrieff trans.,
1923)
253
In general, there is a very strong case for copying verbatim when copying is used to access a
copyrighted work. See Julie E. Cohen, The Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 Fordham L. Rev.
347, 349 (2005) (emphasizing the need to permit individuals to engage in creative play); Tushnet, supra
note 47, at 546.
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miss appreciation. Their very novelty would make them
repulsive until the public had learned the new language in
which their author spoke…At the other end, copyright would
be denied to pictures which appealed to a public less educated
than the judge.254
Likewise, the contribution might be so incremental that it would be difficult for
those who are not experts or well-versed in the field to recognize. In both cases,
neither judges nor juries should be in a position to evaluate the merits of a new
work or its contribution. A greater tolerance for copying leaves room for the
possibility that what may appear to be nothing new, is in fact, something new, and
is accomplished by removing judges and juries from the decision-making process.
Lawyers and laypeople have no expertise or standing to evaluate whether a
historian’s research makes a contribution to the literature any more than they are
in the position to diagnose whether a patient is suffering from a heart attack or
heartburn.
Lastly, limited copyright protection may be justified for works of science
because even when subsequent authors do not say anything new, they may say it
better. As long as works of science do not use the complete expression of or
plagiarize prior works, they do not infringe copyright. One may quote substantially
and repeatedly, adopt the same argument and organization, and otherwise write
the same work as long as it is in the new author’s own words. This is the true
meaning and promise of the idea/expression distinction and fair use. Consider that
fair use originally arose from the doctrine of fair abridgement, in which the
contribution made by the subsequent author was editing a prior work down to
size.255
Allowing future authors the opportunity to express existing works in
their own way is not only a value to the author, but to society as well. A new
author’s expression may be clearer, more persuasive, or simply more enjoyable.
Likewise, a new author may be able to reach new audiences. A two-volume edition
of George Washington’s correspondence may be both more affordable and
approachable, and therefore, more valuable to some than the twelve-volume
edition from which it copied.256 A New York Times article summarizing a scholarly
book on economic policy may make what the author expressed in the book easier
to understand and more relevant to a wider audience. As such, we may tolerate
significant copying in science because the way in which one explains a problem
or communicates a solution is a valuable contribution in its own right. 257 Just how
valuable that contribution may be is ultimately left to the scientific community and
the marketplace, not courts.
So do these instrumental explanations justify greater freedom to copy in
science but not in entertainment? Once again, the answer should be no. Copying
plays a fundamental role in the development of entertainer and scholar alike.
Likewise, lawyers and laypeople do not have the expertise to discern whether an
254

Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographic, 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903).
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 345 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
Id. at 349.
257 Cf. Fromer, supra note 108, at 102 (arguing that repetition of material and expression aids in public
understanding because “different people or groups are likely to find different…expression most natural
to understand and learn from”). In the context of freedom of speech, Judge Learned Hand argued that
the First Amendment, “presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of multiple
tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection.” United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp.
362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
255
256
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entertainer is offering something valuable or new. Not only do they not have the
expertise, but their own personal biases will inevitably play a role in the decision
making. As discussed earlier, this was exactly the point made by Justice Holmes
when he articulated the non-discrimination doctrine. Judges, juries, and lawmakers
have no business determining what is and is not “art” or what is and is not good
entertainment.
In fact, the nature of entertainment may suggest that there should be
greater tolerance for copying. With many forms of entertainment, the process of
copying is inherently part of learning and developing one’s talents. In science, not
much is gained by one researcher painstakingly copying word for word, let alone
photocopying, another’s article.258 While they may reread articles or copy them for
later reference, they do not rewrite other people’s articles to hone their skills.
Artists do. A bass guitar player will play music written by others until his fingers
bleed. Singers will imitate other singers in the hope of sounding just like them.
Painters will paint the same water lilies again and again. Photographers will take
countless photos, attempting to reproduce an iconic image with the same look and
feel as the original. Under these circumstances, repetition is a fundamental means
of developing one’s expressive skills.
In entertainment, repetition can also be more creative and original.259
Copying as imitation is a means of exhibiting one’s talent and setting oneself apart
from other artists. Few bass players will ever play like Flea. Few singers will ever
sing like Freddie Mercury. Few painters will ever paint like Monet. And, few
photographers will capture images like Ansel Adams. Yet, those that can will be
considered great entertainers and artists in their own right. So, even when an artist
sets out with the specific goal of reproducing another’s work, being able to
replicate the work can be a creative achievement, and represents a uniquely
personal contribution.260 As a cellist, if I could play the Prelude to Bach’s Suite
No. 1 in G Major exactly like Yo Yo Ma, it would be an artistic and creative
achievement, and something of my own. In contrast, retyping Justice Holmes’ The
Common Law word for word is not.
Likewise, the idea that “someone may say it better” applies with equal
force, if not more so, in entertainment. The clearest example is the cover song.
Once a song is published, other artists do not need the permission of the copyright
owner to record their own version. The cover artist is required to pay a statutory
fee, but because copyright law does not provide the owner with an exclusive right,
the owner cannot prevent the song from being covered.261 In principle, the
songwriter and/or original recording artist may want exclusivity to allow them to
bargain with subsequent artists or remain the sole version of the song. In such a
world, if you want to record “All Along the Watchtower,” you will need Bob
Dylan’s permission. In the absence of that permission, when individuals want to
listen to “All Along the Watchtower,” they would only be able to listen to Bob
Dylan’s recording unless Dylan chooses to allow others to record their own
258

Again, this is distinct from copying in order to gain access to a work.
See Beebe, supra note 18, at 392 (noting that the act of transformation itself is meaningful even if a
new work is not produced). See also Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace
Assumptions, 51 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 513, 539 (2009) (arguing that fair use should consider more than
the creation of a writing and must take into account noncommercial motivations for creating).
260 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographic, 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903) (“The copy is the personal reaction
of an individual upon nature. Personality always contains something unique. It expresses its singularity
even in handwriting, and a very modest grade of art has in it something irreducible, which is one man's
alone”); Alva Studios, Inc. v. Winninger, 177 F. Supp. 265, 268 (S.D.N.Y 1959) (recognizing copyright
protection for another artist’s reproduction of Rodin’s Hand of God).
261 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2) (2016).
259
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versions. However, because copyright does not currently give Bob Dylan the right
to prevent others from covering his song, you can choose among versions sung by
Jimi Hendrix, Eric Clapton, Lenny Kravitz, or a long list of other artists. These
“copies” are the artists’ attempts to express Bob Dylan’s song in their own way,
and, for some, their way may be preferable. In fact, there is a long history of songs
becoming famous only after a subsequent artist covers the original. 262
While cover songs are a straightforward example, other areas of
entertainment likewise benefit from the idea that “someone may say it better.” A
writer may wish to write a sequel to a famous story263 or tell the story from the
perspective of a different character.264 A cartoonist may want to adopt the style of
another to illustrate different subject matter.265 A songwriter may want to capture
the feel of earlier works266 or even sample portions of the work in their own way.267
The list goes on and on, with authors copying other authors as part of their own
works. This is true whether the artist doing the copying is a professional or a fan.268
Yet, currently, all of these creative endeavors, even an act as simple as mounting
a copyrighted work,269 are at risk of being prohibited by copyright law.
Finally, judges and laypeople are no more qualified to judge
entertainment than they are to judge science. As Justice Holmes argued in
Bleistein, there will inevitably be works of entertainment that the public does not
understand or is not in the position to appreciate, and there will also be works of
entertainment that will be rejected based upon the decision maker’s personal
opinion and taste.270 Yet, these subjective value judgments are fundamentally part
of the question, “Did the alleged infringer take ‘too much’?” Consequently, there
are no instrumental justifications for a double standard.
C. The Chilling of Entertainment
A case can also be made that the creation of works of entertainment is
much more likely to be chilled by fear of copyright liability. The first and foremost
factor is the asymmetric threat of litigation. Authors of entertainment have much
more to fear from litigation because the entertainment industry is notoriously
litigious.271 Copyright owners often have deep pockets to backup threats of
See Bob Leszczak, Who Did it First?: Great Pop Songs and Their Original Artists 22 (2014) (“Big
Yellow Taxi” originally recorded by Neighborhood, rerecorded by Joni Mitchel, Amy Grant, Counting
Crows, among others); Bob Leszczak, Who Did It First?: Great Rock and Roll Cover Songs and Their
Original Artists 3, 22 (2014) (Bob Dylan and Jimmy Hendrix, “All Along the Watchtower;” Carl Perkins
and Elvis Presley, “Blue Sude Shoes”); Bob Leszczak, Who Did it First?: Great Rhythm and Blues Cover
Songs and Their Original Artists (2013).
263 See Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010); BBC, Sequel to Catcher in the Rye “Banned in
U.S.”, BBC (Jan. 13, 2011), http://www.bbc.com/news/entertainment-arts-12181223.
264 See Suntrust v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding the Wind Done Gone,
a story telling Gone With the Wind from the perspective of a slave, to be fair use).
265 See generally Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
(concluding that a movie studio violated an Illustrator’s copyright by copying his style).
266 See supra Part I (discussing “Blurred Lines”).
267 Compare VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2016), with Bridgeport Music, Inc.
v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005).
268 See Rebecca Tushnet, Legal Fictions: Copyright, Fan Fiction and a New Common Law, 17 Loy.
L.A. Ent. L. Rev. 651 (1997); see also Eriq Gardner, CBS, Paramount Settle Lawsuit Over 'Star Trek'
Fan Film, The Hollywood Reporter (Jan. 20, 2017, 11:43 AM),
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/cbs-paramount-settle-lawsuit-star-trek-fan-film-966433.
269
See Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580, 581-82 (7th Cir. 1997); Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque
A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1341, 1343-44 (9th Cir. 1988).
270 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographic Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903).
271 The Recording Industry Association of American has a long history of using copyright litigation and
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litigation. Some are extraordinarily protective of their copyright because they are
not authors themselves but instead rely upon those copyrights as a source of
income.272 Last, but not least, as the “Blurred Lines” verdict illustrates, there can
be a great deal of money at stake. As such, the threat of litigation, the cost of
defending a copyright infringement action, and the potential for a multimillion
dollar verdict are significant deterrents to engaging in even lawful uses of works
of entertainment. There is simply no corresponding threat in the sciences. While
there are exceptions, the financial value of copyrights for scholarly publications is
so small that universities have only recently begun to claim ownership of the works
of their faculty.273
The following three factors also suggest that science might enjoy more
breathing room even when faced with the possibility of litigation. First, authors
often explicitly explain how their work adds to the existing body of knowledge.
Making one’s contribution clear is part of scholarly norms. As such, authors not
only focus on how their works contribute something new, but more importantly,
they explain this to the reader. This allows authors to frame their work and its
relationship to the work of others. Consequently, to the extent that readers may
debate the appropriateness of an author’s use of other’s works, the author has at
least had the opportunity to set the terms of the debate.
Second, in science, research is governed by agreed-upon and published
standards and guidelines. As discussed above, the scientific method sets a
universal standard for determining how to proceed with scientific experimentation
and when copying is a contribution. Similarly, institutions and departments create
and publish rules and guidelines for what constitutes acceptable research, and
establish ethical codes of conduct. While plagiarism may not subject an author to
copyright liability, it will certainly subject the author to the censure of peers and
their institutions. In other words, in science, authors have a clearer understanding
of when and what kind of copying is acceptable even without regard to copyright.
Third, because of the “expertise” associated with science, there is a
natural tendency for those not trained in the subject to consider their own
competency to make substantive decisions involving science. After all, what does
a constitutional law professor know about the Hindenburg or molecular chemistry?
threats of litigation to control all uses of their works. For an excellent summary of their legal campaign
in response to file sharing, see Electronic Frontier Foundation, RIAA v. The People: Five Years Later
(Sep. 30 2008), https://www.eff.org/wp/riaa-v-people-five-years-later. While the RIAA and large
corporations such as the Walt Disney Corp. may immediately come to mind, individuals have also been
known to be especially litigious. For example, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s family is very aggressive in
preventing other from using Dr. King’s speeches without their authorization. See Foley Hoag, Martin
Luther King, Jr. And Copyright: Five Things You Should Know (Jan. 11 2018),
http://www.trademarkandcopyrightlawblog.com/2018/01/martin-luther-king-jr-and-copyright-fivethings-you-should-know/.
272 While this includes families of the original authors like the Kings and the Gayes, it also includes what
some have described as “copyright trolls,” a phrase borrowed from patent trolls describing patent owners
that do not use those patents to create inventions, but instead as the basis for generating revenue through
the threat of litigation. See Electronic Frontier Foundation, Copyright Trolls, Electronic Frontier
Foundation https://www.eff.org/issues/copyright-trolls (last visited May 28, 2018).
273
See Ann Spinger, Intellectual Property Issues for Faculty, American Association of University
Professors, https://www.aaup.org/issues/copyright-distance-education-intellectual-property/resourcescopyright-distance-education-and/intellectual-property-issues-faculty (last visited May 28, 2018). In
contrast, universities routinely assert ownership over faculty patent rights. See Bd. of Teachers of the
Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 U.S. 776, 785 (2011) (holding that
patented inventions first vest with the inventor); see also Laura Lape, Ownership of Copyrightable
Works of University Professors: The Interplay Between the Copyright Act and University Copyright
Policies, 37 Vill. L. Rev. 223, 251- 252 (1992); Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The Creative Employee and the
Copyright Act of 1976, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 590, 591-592 (1987).
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When people are aware of their own limited knowledge and expertise, research
suggests that they are more open to accepting new facts and opinions from those
with more.274 As such, one would expect that expert opinions may play an
important role when a jury is asked to judge the merits of copying in science. So,
even in litigation, authors can anticipate that standards, guidelines, and codes of
their profession will play a role. While following the guidelines of one’s profession
may do nothing to guarantee how well that work will be received, it should provide
a degree of confidence that at least the work will not be the focus of a lawsuit.
In art, authors are exposed to much greater subjectivity, and, therefore,
have more to fear. Initially, while it may be clear to the author what they
contributed, it is not a practice to explicitly describe that contribution. In science,
authors frame how their work is viewed in advance. In art, the only immediate
evidence will be the work itself. To the extent that the audience perceives a
similarity with another work, they develop an opinion about the copying without
any context from the author. This subjective interpretation exposes authors to the
risk that new contributions may be mistakenly considered plagiarism because of
the viewer’s first impression.275
More importantly, there are no written standards, published guidelines,
or adopted codes in entertainment. There is no comparable professional or
institutional consensus on how art is to be created, how it is to be judged, or even
what constitutes art. Instead, whether copying in general -- or any given degree or
instance of copying -- is acceptable depends upon social norms and the subjective
determination of the artist whose work is copied.276 Accordingly, how much is too
much will vary from artist to artist and from case to case. Some artists copy others
in their own work. Some do not. Some artists encourage others to copy their work.
Some do not. Some artists consider copying flattery. Others consider it theft. As
such, the copyright owner, who may or may not be the original author, initially
decides whether the subsequent author’s copying is acceptable to them. If the
copyright owner does not like how their work is being used they may object,
threaten litigation, and/or actually litigate. If the copyright owner chooses to
litigate, the decision as to how much copying is too much is then made by a jury.
Because the decisions of individual artists and juries are very difficult to predict,
in the absence of virtual protection, the sword of copyright will always hang over
the heads of creators of art. Unless one attempts to create something “entirely”
new or avoids creating altogether, there are no rules of the road to determine ex
ante whether an act of copying should be considered acceptable.
Lastly, people are much less hesitant to express an opinion on
entertainment. Unlike science, the general public regularly makes judgments about
entertainment. We listen to music, watch videos, and read works of “taste and
opinion,” and in each of these instances, we make decisions based upon our
subjective evaluation of the work. Likewise, few of us engage in titration or
multivariate regression analysis, but we regularly engage in artistic expression. We
274

See Steven Sloman & Philip Fernbach, The Knowledge Illusion 19-23 (2017) (discussing research
where subjects were asked to evaluate their knowledge on a subject before and after attempting to explain
the topic to others); see also Yuval Harari, People Have Limited Knowledge, N.Y. Times (Apr. 18,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/18/books/review/knowledge-illusion-steven-sloman-philipfernbach.html.
275 There are of course exceptions, for example, when a parodist notes specifically that the work is a
parody.
276
See Dotan Oliar & Christopher Sprigman, Intellectual Property Norms in Stand-Up Comedy, in
Making and Unmaking Intellectual Property: Creative Production in Legal and Cultural Perspective 385
(Mario Biagioli, Peter Jaszi & Martha Woodmansee, eds., 2010); Aaron Perzanowski, Tattoos & IP
Norms, 98 Minn. L. Rev. 511 (2013).
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do so even when it is as simple as singing along to music in the car or posting
comments on social media. And, while great art requires special talent, engaging
in entertainment and making decisions about entertainment require no such
expertise; in all of these examples, personal opinion alone is sufficient. If asked to
provide this opinion, there is no reason for jury members to defer to members of
the entertainment community when asked whether the author took “too much.” In
fact, some may bristle at and automatically reject the opinion of “so-called
experts.” In science, an author may find some solace and security in following the
accepted methods of science and professional guidelines to avoid litigation, and in
knowing that if there is litigation, those standards will be considered when
determining liability. In contrast, in entertainment, an author has no map to guide
them when creating their work or fall back upon when defending their work
against claims of “too much” copying. Instead, authors face the very real
possibility that the merit of their work will be judged based on the subjective
opinions of the least tolerant copyright owner and the least tolerant jury.
As the preceding demonstrates, when the relative values of science and
entertainment are removed from the calculus, there are no inherent or instrumental
reasons that justify discriminating between factual and fanciful works.
Acknowledging that there are no objective reasons to support copyright’s double
standard, however, does not mean that we must treat them equally. The following
section outlines why the First Amendment’s protection of freedom of expression
suggests copyright should only prohibit virtual appropriation and translation.
V. ENTERTAINMENT IS EXPRESSION
How should the law respond to copyright’s double standard? Congress
and courts could and, as this Article argues, should protect all expression equally.
Because copyright protects authors from virtual appropriation in science, works of
entertainment should be subject to the same standard. All authors should be free
to express themselves so long as they do not tell the same story or the same story
in a different medium. Then, copyright would no longer dismiss entertainment and
the corresponding freedom of authors to express themselves. This approach would
promote creative expression for all works by prohibiting piracy while still
providing the necessary breathing room for new expression. However, recognizing
the hypocrisy of a double standard does not mean lawmakers will reject it.
Congress and the courts could simply embrace copyright’s current discrimination
against entertainment and reject the non-discrimination principle. For example,
because current copyright protection favors existing copyright owners, Congress
could decide to protect their economic interests rather than the creative freedom
of future authors.277 Even so, this section argues that without a principled
justification for imposing greater restrictions upon works of entertainment, as
applied to those works, copyright violates the First Amendment’s guarantee of
freedom of expression. And, continuing to apply a double standard necessarily
creates a conflict between copyright and the First Amendment.
A. Unreliable Internal Safeguards
As mentioned earlier, the Supreme Court has not subjected copyright law
277

There is a rich body of literature arguing that copyright does not, in fact, protect authors but instead
moneyed interests. See Ronald V. Bettig, Copyright Culture: The Political Economy of Intellectual
Property (1996); Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture (2005).
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to additional First Amendment scrutiny. Instead, in the two cases in which the
Court directly addressed the question, it concluded that First Amendment scrutiny
was unnecessary because fair use and the idea/expression distinction sufficiently
safeguarded the First Amendment interests in those cases. Moreover, on its face,
copyright complements the First Amendment by increasing the potential financial
rewards available to authors and by making markets for copyrighted works more
efficient. The unfair competition created by allowing subsequent merchants to sell
unauthorized copies in direct competition with the original would significantly
undermine the financial incentives to create and disseminate those works. Because
of this speech-promoting function, Justice O’Connor wrote that “it should not be
forgotten that the Framers intended copyright itself to be the engine of free
expression.”278 Additionally, as discussed below, to the extent that copyright
restricts expression, the internal limits of fair use and the idea/expression
distinction generally, on their face, alleviate free speech concerns.
Based upon these twin pillars, the Supreme Court upheld a copyright
judgment against The Nation for publishing unauthorized excerpts from President
Ford’s memoirs.279 At the time, the memoir was unpublished and Time Magazine
had negotiated the exclusive right to publish significant quotations from the
manuscript prior to its publication.280 As a result of The Nation’s actions, Time
rescinded the agreement.281 In upholding the infringement judgment, the Supreme
Court rejected The Nation’s argument that its publication of quotes from Ford’s
memoirs -- especially the President’s explanation for pardoning President Nixon - was newsworthy, and, therefore, protected by the First Amendment. 282 According
to the Court, freedom of speech was adequately protected by the idea/expression
distinction and fair use.283
Similarly, in Eldred, the Supreme Court upheld the Copyright Term
Extension Act, which extended the length of copyright protection by an additional
twenty years to its current term of the life of the author plus seventy years. 284 In
that decision, the plaintiffs argued that the term extension violated both the power
delegated to Congress to create exclusive rights for “limited times,” and violated
the First Amendment’s requirements for content neutral regulations of speech.285
With respect to free speech, the plaintiffs argued that term extension was not
sufficiently tailored to advance an important government interest. 286 While the
Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the First Amendment
required heightened scrutiny under the circumstances for the reasons discussed
before, it also rejected the Court of Appeals conclusion that copyrights are
“categorically immune from challenges under the First Amendment.”287 Instead,
Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion left open the possibility that First Amendment
scrutiny may be justified, “but when, as in this case, Congress has not altered the
traditional contours of copyright protection, further First Amendment scrutiny is
unnecessary.”288 In both decisions, the Supreme Court concluded that additional
First Amendment scrutiny was unnecessary to protect freedom of expression
278

Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985).
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284 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 193-94 (2003).
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287 Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2001), aff’d Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
288 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221.
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because any restrictions of free expression were adequately protected by fair use
and the idea/expression distinction.
The twin pillars the Supreme Court has relied upon are erected upon very
shaky foundations.289 While the Framers of the Constitution enacted both the
Copyright Clause and the First Amendment within several years of one another,
copyright was significantly narrower than it is today. The original Copyright Act
of 1790 prevented others from selling or otherwise distributing wholesale
duplicates of the copyrighted work. Authors could not protect plots, characters, or
style. New authors were free to translate a copyrighted work into another language,
and as discussed earlier, free to abridge existing works. Likewise, copyright
protection only lasted fourteen years with the option of renewing for another
fourteen years, and required authors to follow various formalities, including
registering, providing notice, and depositing copies of their works, before they
were entitled to protection. Under these circumstances, copyright was not so much
a restriction upon expression as it was a prohibition against an unfair business
practice, and the default rule was no protection. Today, none of these limitations
exist. So while it is accurate to say that the Framers recognized the importance of
copyright, they would not recognize copyright as it exists today. 290 Consequently,
one cannot rely heavily upon the Framers’ understanding.
Reliance upon fair use and the idea/expression distinction also rests on
shaky ground. Addressing free speech concerns by relying upon copyright’s
internal doctrines of fair use and the idea/expression distinction has been described
as “definitional balancing.”291 Because these doctrines play such a fundamental
role in mitigating unconstitutional restrictions upon expression, Harry Rosenfield
argues that fair use should be explicitly considered a constitutional doctrine with
its scope determined by the First Amendment.292 As demonstrated by the Supreme
Court’s decisions in Harper & Row and Eldred, judges have not adopted
Rosenfield’s reasoning, but have continued to rely upon definitional balancing.
However, “[b]y addressing free speech concerns internally within copyright,
definitional balancing leaves free speech at the mercy of copyright doctrine. When
judges limit the idea/expression distinction or fair use in favor of expanding
copyright’s property interests, as they have done in recent years, they limit free
speech.”293 This is a form of copyright Lochnerism that “transforms the
constitutional relationship between copyright and the First Amendment from one
in which the Constitution defines the limits of copyright to one in which copyright
defines the limits of the Constitution.”294
By relying upon definitional balancing alone, judges open the door to
judicial interpretation of copyright and its relationship to the Constitution based
upon their personal economic philosophy:
289

I have discussed these arguments in greater detail elsewhere, so I will only summarize them here. See
Raymond Shih Ray Ku, F(r)ee Expression – Reconciling Copyright and the First Amendment, 57 Case
W. Res. L. Rev. 863 (2007); see also Tushnet, supra note 47.
290 It is also fair to say that the Framers would not recognize the freedom of speech protected by the First
Amendment either. Compare Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (concluding that speech
advocating lawless behavior may only be punished for “inciting or producing imminent lawless action
and is likely to incite or produce such action”), with Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51-53 (1919)
(upholding conviction for advocating resistance to the draft).
291 See Ku, supra note 289, at 869 (citing Melvin B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First
Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and the Press?, 17 UCLA L. Rev. 1180, 1184 (1970)).
292
See Harry N. Rosenfield, The Constitutional Dimensions of “Fair Use” in Copyright Law, 50 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 790, 796-98 (1975).
293 Ku, supra note 289, at 871.
294 Id. at 893.
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First, by rejecting the need for additional constitutional scrutiny
when Congress expands copyright beyond the Framers’
copyright, definitional balancing ignores or manipulates the
baseline for evaluating the relationship between copyright and
free speech. Second, by ignoring the baseline problem,
definitional balancing ultimately allows judges to embed their
own disputed vision of property within constitutional law at the
First Amendment’s expense.295
In short, definitional balancing allows judges to intentionally or unintentionally
redefine the relationship between freedom and property rights based upon personal
biases without necessarily considering or even acknowledging First Amendment
concerns. As a respected member of the Law and Economics school of thought, it
should come as no surprise that in Kienitz, Judge Easterbrook relied upon
economic principles to determine the scope of fair use, and did so without
considering the implications for freedom of expression.296
Consider the following decision as another example of the dangers of
definitional balancing. In Mannion v. Coors Brewing Company, Coors used a
black and white photograph of an African-American man, wearing a white shirt
and jewelry, on advertising billboards.297 It was undisputed that the image was
based upon a photograph taken by the plaintiff Jonathan Mannion and copied many
of his artistic choices.298 Originally, Mannion gave permission to the advertising
company to use his color photograph of Kevin Garnett shot against a cloudy sky
in which Garnett is wearing white clothing, jewelry, and a black cap. 299 This photo
was used by the company as part of its initial proposal to Coors. 300 It was also
undisputed that the photograph used by Coors was not Mannion’s photograph.301
It was taken by another photographer, with a different model, on a different day. 302
It was printed in black and white and captured from a different angle. 303 In their
defense, the defendants argued that the image used on the billboard was permitted
under the idea/expression distinction.304 In other words, they only copied the ideas
embodied in Mannion’s photograph, and not the actual expression represented by
the photograph itself.
In rejecting the defendants’ idea/expression argument, Judge Kaplan
launched a full scale assault on the doctrine.305 He began by noting that the
idea/expression distinction originated with literary works where, “it makes sense
to speak of the idea conveyed by the literary work and to distinguish it from its
expression.”306 In contrast, he argued, it is much more difficult to draw a line
between ideas and expression in other contexts, and this is especially true for visual
works.307 In fact, according to Judge Kaplan, “it is not clear that there is any real
295
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distinction between the idea in a work of art and its expression.” 308 A
photographer’s original contribution in a photograph, the contribution that entitles
it to copyright protection, can be described as its conception, and “the word
‘conception’ is a cousin of ‘concept,’ and both are akin to ‘idea.’”309 Based upon
this reasoning, Judge Kaplan concluded that the “idea/expression distinction in
photography, and probably the other visual arts thus achieves nothing.”310 Because
it “achieves nothing,” the only question is whether a jury may conclude that the
photographs are substantially similar to one another.311 Taken to its logical
conclusion, this means that one of the principal means of preventing copyright
from chilling new expression, the idea/expression distinction, no longer plays any
role with respect to photographs and, perhaps, all of the visual arts.
Judge Kaplan reached this breathtaking conclusion by equating what a
photographer must do to obtain copyright protection with what copyright will
ultimately protect. When photography was first introduced, it was argued that
photographs were not writings and, therefore, could not be protected by
copyright.312 According to this argument, photographs did not “embody the
intellectual conception of its author,” but were instead “mere mechanical
reproduction[s].”313 In upholding Congress’ decision to protect photographs, the
Supreme Court noted that the “ordinary” photograph may lack sufficient
originality, but that the photograph in question did “embody the intellectual
conception of its author.”314 Quoting from the lower court’s findings, the Supreme
Court concluded that the photograph was sufficiently original because it embodied
the photographer’s
own original mental conception, to which he gave visible form
by posing the said Oscar Wilde in front of the camera, selecting
and arranging the costume, draperies, and other various
accessories in said photograph, arranging the subject so as to
present graceful outlines, arranging and disposing the light and
shade, suggesting and evoking the desired expression, and from
such disposition, arrangement, or representation, made entirely
by plaintiff, he produced the picture in suit.315
Initially, Judge Kaplan’s opinion in Mannion expands upon Burrow-Giles by
providing a comprehensive description and classification of the creative decisions
made by photographers. According to Kaplan, photographers make creative
decisions when they determine how an image should be rendered, when it should
be captured, and what should be captured.316 In other words, these are the ways in
which photographers demonstrate the degree of creativity necessary to obtain
copyright protection. In the absence of even a minimum degree of creativity, the
image would not receive copyright protection. This means that photographs taken
by a monkey cannot be protected by copyright because the monkey did not make
decisions with regard to rendering, timing, and subject that would otherwise
308
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“embody the intellectual conception” of an author.317
As Judge Kaplan recognized, how to render an image, when to capture
it, and what to capture are very much ideas, but as Hoehling illustrated, just
because an idea is original does not mean it is protected. In Mannion, the analysis
is considered necessary because of the difficulty identifying the photographic
equivalent of the distinction between the book and the writing contained in the
book.318 However, there is a rather simple and logical equivalent of the
idea/expression distinction for photography, and the visual arts in general. In the
visual arts, one can distinguish between the print (or the digital era -- the file), and
the image contained in the print. Under these circumstances, because Coors copied
neither the print nor the image, one could have concluded that the defendants only
copied Mannion’s ideas.319 However, rather than accept the possibility that
copyright may only protect photographs against virtual appropriation, Judge
Kaplan obliterates the distinction between ideas and expression altogether.320
More importantly, for this discussion, he does so without even pausing to consider
the First Amendment implications of this decision. While a copyright idealist may
consider this result desirable, it is by no means dictated by copyright law, and by
reaching this result, the court eliminated one of copyright’s two internal First
Amendment safeguards.
While Mannion is a particularly dramatic example of the failure of
definitional balancing, it is just one of many examples in which courts may lose
the First Amendment forest for the copyright trees. With respect to fair use, the
clearest example of the corrosive effect of copyright Lochnerism can be found in
judicial interpretations of what the Supreme Court has described as “undoubtedly
the single most important element of fair use,”321 “the effect of the use upon the
potential market for or value of the copyright work.”322 The Supreme Court
originally described this factor as determining whether copying was used to
“supersede the use of the original work, and substitute . . . for it, such a use will be
deemed in law a piracy.”323 To make this determination, courts considered “the
degree in which they use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or
supersede the object, of the original works.”324 In other words, even if the
subsequent author only copies a portion of a work, when the purpose of copying
is to displace the original, and may in fact harm the sales of the original work, such
copying is not a fair use.
With rare exceptions, like Sony, courts generally embrace a much
broader and arguably circular definition of relevant market harm. Relying upon
the statutory language of “potential market,” courts currently do not limit their
analysis to the original market for the work, but instead, consider whether the
unauthorized use will harm the market for licensing such uses. 325 In other words,
See Camila Domonoske, Monkey Can’t Own Copyright to His Selfie, Federal Judge Says, NPR
(Jan. 7, 2016, 10:34 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/01/07/462245189/federaljudge-says-monkey-cant-own-copyright-to-his-selfie.
318 Mannion, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 458-61.
319 Id. at 461-63.
320
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justify going to a jury.
321 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985).
322
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
323
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 345 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
324 Id. at 348 (emphasis added).
325 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994) (considering whether the market
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rather than limiting the rights of copyright owners to instances in which the
unauthorized use would harm the existing value of the copyright by displacing the
original, courts presume that unauthorized uses are unfair unless the use is not the
kind that a copyright owner would normally consent to or license. 326 In Harper &
Row, this meant that the magazine’s publication of an important news story was
not fair because it violated President Ford’s right to license the first coverage of
his memoir.327 In Castle Rock, this meant that the copyright owner had the
exclusive right to control Seinfeld trivia books even if the SAT increased demand
for the television show.328 Put differently, Wendy Gordon argued that if copyright
is a response to market failure, fair use should be interpreted as a response to
market failure as well.329 Under these circumstances, if there is no reason to doubt
that a functional market for licensing the use might develop, the use should not be
considered fair.
In contrast, a parody of the song “Oh Pretty Woman” 330 and a critical
rewriting of Gone with the Wind, written from the perspective of a slave,331 could
be protected as fair uses because it is assumed that copyright owners would not
license such works. (No one would license a negative review.) In general, this
means that unless works of art either parody or otherwise critically comment on a
copyrighted work, copyright owners not only have the right to engage in the use
themselves, but the exclusive right to do so.332 For example, if the SAT was
considered a fair use, the decision would not have denied the makers of Seinfeld
the right or ability to publish their own trivia book or even to license the SAT; it
would have only denied them a monopoly on all such trivia books and the power
to prevent the publication of such works. As such, fair use has shrunk from a
doctrine that protected even the abridgement of copyrighted works to one that
protects future authors only when they copy in ways or in markets that the
copyright owner would not otherwise exploit. Once again, limiting fair use to
instances of market failure may be excellent policy. However, by adopting this
policy and limiting the scope of fair use, courts reduce the ability of fair use to
protect freedom of expression. As Justice Brennan argued in his dissenting opinion
in Harper,
[T]he Court pursues the laudable goal of protecting “the
economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas,” [but this]
economic interest is achieved . . . through an exceedingly
narrow definition of the scope of fair use. The progress of arts
and sciences and the robust public debate essential to an
enlightened citizenry are ill served by this constricted reading
of the fair use doctrine.333
is one that the copyright owner “would develop or license others to develop”); Princeton Univ. Press v.
Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1387-88 (6th Cir. 1996) (rejecting circularity argument); Am.
Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 912, 929-31 (2d Cir. 1995) (rejecting circularity argument).
326 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592; Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at 1387-88; Am. Geophysical Union,
60 F.3d at 929-31.
327
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 529, 567 (1985).
328 Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Group, 150 F.3d 132, 145-46 (2d Cir. 1998).
329 Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax
Case and its Predecessors, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1600 (1982).
330 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591-92.
331
Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1276-77 (11th Cir. 2001).
332
Even with regard to criticism and parody, both Campbell and Suntrust Bank left open the possibility
that such uses may not be fair. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591-92; Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1276-77.
333 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 579 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
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While Professor Gordon has considered the implications this may have on speech
and how to protect those interests,334 despite Justice Brennan’s concerns, the courts
have not. In light of judicial limits placed upon the idea/expression distinction and
fair use, the First Amendment does not determine the boundaries of copyright.
Instead, copyright defines, and constantly redefines, the boundaries of free
expression.
Moreover, for the purposes of this discussion as demonstrated in Part IV,
entertainment disproportionately suffers the consequences of this erosion, and
both doctrines are the vehicles for the discrimination against creators of such
works. One might even argue that artistic freedom is being sacrificed to create the
illusion that definitional balancing protects freedom of expression if only for
science. Whether this is consistent with the Constitution has yet to be tested.
B. First Amendment Harms
Because of the historic relationship between copyright and freedom of
speech, to paraphrase Justice Ginsburg, it is fair to say that the First Amendment
“bears less heavily when speakers assert the right to [sell] other people’s
speeches.”335 However, if definitional balancing cannot be relied upon to protect
freedom of expression, especially freedom of expression for works of
entertainment, how should copyright be evaluated under the First Amendment?
The answer to “What’s the big deal? It’s just entertainment,” may be that it is more
than just entertainment, it is freedom of artistic expression. While a full discussion
of the First Amendment’s protection for freedom of expression and how it should
be applied to copyright is beyond the scope of the Article, four problems are
readily identifiable. First, as it is currently applied, copyright restrictions are based
upon the content of the speech, and as such violate the basic First Amendment
prohibition against content regulation. Second, this content-based regulation and
copyright’s encroachment upon freedom of expression is made possible by the
vagueness of both the rights and defenses recognized by copyright. Third,
expanding copyright protection beyond virtual appropriation may not satisfy
intermediate scrutiny, let alone strict scrutiny, because, as applied, the purpose is
to suppress expression. Fourth, even if we were to accept that there is a legitimate
purpose unrelated to the suppression of expression, as applied, copyright’s
exclusive rights are not sufficiently tailored to achieve such a purpose.
In general, the First Amendment makes no distinction between works of
science and works of entertainment. Both receive the same treatment and
protection. The First Amendment protects works of entertainment ranging from
novels to films to video games.336 With a few exceptions, such as obscene speech
and commercial speech, the First Amendment prohibits government from
regulating speech based upon its content.337 In other words, freedom of speech
dissenting).
334 Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural
Law of Intellectual Property, 102 Yale L.J. 1533 (1993).
335 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003) (“The first amendment securely protects the freedom
to make - or decline to make - one’s own speech; it bears less heavily when speakers assert the right to
make other people’s speeches.”). But see Tushnet, supra note 47, at 563-64 (critiquing this precise point).
336 See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011) (“Like the protected books, plays,
movies that preceded them video games communicated ideas . . . . That suffices to confer First
Amendment protection.”).
337 United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717 (2012) (“[C]ontent-based restrictions on speech have
been permitted, as a general matter, only when confined to the few historic and traditional categories [of
209

VOL. 17:2

VIRGINIA SPORTS AND ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL

SPRING 2018

protects an individual's freedom to express themselves as they see fit whether by
wearing a jacket saying “f**k the draft,”338 burning the American flag,339
exhibiting a movie that portrays adultery, 340 creating a violent video game,341 or
filming individuals engaging in sexual intercourse.342 As the Supreme Court has
recognized, “Under our Constitution, ‘esthetic and moral judgments about art and
literature . . . are for the individual to make, not for government to decree.’”343
One might be tempted to argue that Article I, Section 8 justifies contentbased discrimination because it refers specifically to science.344 However, as
demonstrated in Part II, this interpretation was fundamentally rejected by the
Supreme Court in Bleistein.345 Moreover, while the Constitution prefaces
exclusive rights as promoting the progress of science, this does not justify granting
stronger, therefore more restrictive rights to works of entertainment. As Justice
O’Connor wrote in Harper, “It is fundamentally at odds with the scheme of
copyright to accord lesser rights in those works that are of greatest importance to
the public. Such a notion ignores the major premise of copyright, and injures
author and public alike.”346 In other words, the Copyright Clause might justify
content discrimination if Congress chose to provide greater protection to science
or to only offer protection to works of science despite the Supreme Court decision
in Bleistein. However, it does not justify greater exclusivity for entertainment.
Again, as discussed in Part II, to the extent that there is textual and historical
support for treating works of entertainment differently, it would be to deny
Congress the authority to protect such works at all.347 Because courts provide
greater protection to entertainment than science, these interpretations violate not
only copyright’s principle of non-discrimination, but the First Amendment
prohibition against content-based discrimination as well.
In addition to regulating speech based upon content, copyright runs afoul
of the void-for-vagueness doctrine. Under this doctrine, the Supreme Court has
interpreted the First Amendment to prohibit both civil and criminal liability when
the regulation of speech is too vague for an average person to understand. 348 In
other words, even when speech may be constitutionally regulated, the law must be
sufficiently clear for individuals to understand what is prohibited and what is

expression] long familiar to the bar.”) (internal quotations omitted).
338 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).
339 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989).
340 Kingsley v. Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684, 689 (1959).
341
Brown, 564 U.S. at 790.
342 United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 811 (2000).
343 Brown, 564 U.S. at 790 (quoting Playboy, 529 U.S. at 818); see also Ashcroft v. Am. Civil
Liberties Union, 535 U. S. 564, 573 (2002) (“[A]s a general matter, the First Amendment means that
government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or
its content.”).
344 See Snow, supra note 18, at 3.
345 See supra Part II.A.
346 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985).
347 It would be quite plausible to deny copyright protection to works of entertainment and still provide
some degree of protection under the commerce clause in the same way trademarks are protected.
However, this would inevitably suggest that they would not be entitled to exclusive rights. See TradeMark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879) (holding that the copyright clause did not authorize Congress to regulate
trademarks).
348 FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 253 (2012) (“Even when speech is not at issue,
the void for vagueness doctrine addresses at least two connected but discrete due process concerns: first,
that regulated parties should know what is required of them so they may act accordingly; second,
precision and guidance are necessary so that those enforcing the law do not act in an arbitrary or
discriminatory way. When speech is involved, rigorous adherence to those requirements is necessary to
ensure that ambiguity does not chill protected speech.”) (citation omitted).
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permitted. Once again, as it is currently interpreted, copyright fails this First
Amendment requirement. Initially, what is entertainment? How does one define
entertainment? Is it what the Second Circuit described as expression on matters of
taste or opinion? Editorials are by definition the opinion of their authors, but they
also seek to address problems. Charles Dickens’ A Christmas Carol is a fictional
novel about Christmas ghosts, but it also represents Dickens’ understanding of
human nature and proposes how we should treat one another. Is an objective,
principled definition even possible, or is it closer to the Supreme Court’s effort to
define obscenity which famously led Justice Stewart to remark, “I know it when I
see it?”349
Even if it is possible to define entertainment, when copyright is
interpreted to protect more than virtual appropriation, its protections are inherently
vague and subjective. With respect to the right of reproduction, what does it mean,
in the words of Judge Jerome Frank, “whether defendant took from the plaintiff’s
work so much of what is pleasing . . . that the defendant wrongfully appropriated
something which belongs to the plaintiff.”?350 What is the total concept and feel of
a work?351 What is the heart of a work?352 Is a work based upon another because
the subsequent author begins with that work and admits that they “copied” it? 353
What does it mean to recast or transform the original? 354 It could mean to tell the
same story in a different medium,355 or it could mean using any recognizable
element in an entirely new work.356 The vagueness of these rights is compounded
by the vagueness of the idea/expression distinction and the fair use doctrine.
Once copyright reaches beyond virtual appropriation, it becomes
increasingly difficult to draw the line between expression and ideas. In arguably
the most famous description of the distinction, Judge Learned Hand wrote,
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of
patterns of increasing generality will fit equally well, as more
and more of the incident is left out. The last may perhaps be no
more than the most general statement of what the play is about,
and at times might consist only of its title; but there is a point
in this series of abstractions where they are no longer protected,
since otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of his
“ideas,” to which, apart from their expression, his property is
never extended.357
According to Judge Learned Hand, in determining when expression ends and ideas
349

Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946). For an excellent discussion of nonliteral
copyright infringement see Pamela Samuelson, A Fresh Look at Tests for Nonliteral Copyright
Infringement, 107 Nw. L. Rev. 1821 (2013).
351 Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970).
352 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564-65 (1985).
353 Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 706, 714 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). (“As defendants
have conceded access to plaintiff's copyrighted illustration, a somewhat lesser degree of similarity
suffices to establish a copyright infringement than might otherwise be required.”).
354 Compare Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580, 581-82 (7th Cir. 1997) (considering whether the
mounting of a copyrighted work on tiles or paper created a derivative work), with Mirage Editions,
Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1341, 1343-44 (9th Cir. 1988).
355 Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
356
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. American Honda Motor Co., 900 F. Supp. 1287, 1287 (C.D. Cal.
1995) (concluding that a Honda commercial copied enough of the James Bond character to violate
copyright in that character).
357 Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
350
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begin, “Nobody has ever been able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever can.” 358
Judge Hand reiterated this challenge in a subsequent case in which he wrote,
The test for infringement of a copyright is of necessity vague. .
. . Obviously, no principle can be stated as to when an imitator
has gone beyond copying the “idea,” and has borrowed its
“expression.” Decisions must therefore inevitably be ad hoc.359
Judge Hand’s observations continue to be accurate. As illustrated by the previous
discussion of Mannion, untethered from the constraints of literal appropriation, the
boundary between expression and idea still defies definition.
Similarly, the fair use doctrine provides little guidance for a subsequent
author to determine whether their intended use violates copyright law. Initially,
fair use is an affirmative defense, and as such, requires an author to pay for legal
representation simply to evaluate let alone raise the defense. As such, the defense
itself imposes a cost upon the speaker, and this cost will fall disproportionately
upon new authors rather than established authors. Furthermore, a legal opinion on
fair use will provide little guidance and comfort to authors interested in more than
de minimis copying. If drawing lines between ideas and expressions is inevitably
ad hoc, fair use determinations are expressly made on a case-by-case basis. Even
parodies, which are perhaps the closest fair use comes to quintessential example,
may be still be considered unfair if the author copies “too much.”360 It should come
as no surprise, then, that on more than one occasion, courts, including the Supreme
Court, have described the fair use doctrine as “the most troublesome in the whole
of copyright law.”361
So not only are the two principal protections for freedom of speech not
doing their job, they are inherently vague and provide future authors with little-tono guidance on whether they have gone too far. And, arguably, the vagueness of
these rules is what enables judges to dismiss the value of entertainment and
obscured entertainment’s disparate treatment in the first place.362 If copyright is
not limited to virtual appropriation, the only guaranteed way to avoid liability is
for an author to obtain permission from the copyright owner which may or may
not require them to pay for that permission, change their expression, or forgo
expressing themselves altogether. Under any other circumstances, the fact that a
speaker may face these choices would be unacceptable under the First
Amendment.363
With respect to these questions, the Supreme Court’s decision in New
York Times v. Sullivan and its progeny364 may guide First Amendment analysis of
copyright. Both copyright and reputation are considered property interests that
may be protected consistently with the First Amendment. In general, liability in
358

Id.
Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960).
360 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 589 (1994) (“This is not, of course, to say
that anyone who calls himself a parodist can skim the cream and get away scot free. In parody, as in
news reporting, see Harper & Row, context is everything, and the question of fairness asks what else the
parodist did besides go to the heart of the original.”).
361 See Sony Corp. of Am., v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 475 (1984) (quoting Dellar v.
Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 661 (2d Cir. 1939)).
362 See Adler, supra note 127, at 574-75.
363 See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) (requiring a clear definition for obscene speech).
364
376 U.S. 254 (1964); see, e.g., Harte-Hanks Communications v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657 (1989)
(refining actual malice standard); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749
(1985) (concluding that actual malice did not apply to private speech); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323 (1974) (concluding that the actual malice does not apply to private individuals).
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both cases may be considered consistent with freedom of expression. For
copyright, this is based upon the Copyright Clause, and for defamation this is
based upon the conclusion that false statements of fact are not protected by the
First Amendment.365 Both involve actions to vindicate individual rights, and as
such are based upon an individual’s decision whether to seek redress for a
perceived wrong. Some individuals are more tolerant about comments on their
reputation, and some authors are more tolerant of unauthorized copying.
Additionally, copyright and defamation liability are based upon judicially created
standards that do not readily lend themselves to bright line rules. As discussed
above, for copyright this includes, among others, determining whether the
infringing work is substantially similar and whether it is a fair use. In defamation,
this includes, among others, determining whether a statement is defamatory and
what constitutes an injury to reputation. Finally, both are also subject to affirmative
defenses. At common law, truth is an absolute defense to allegations of defamation
much the same way that fair use is a defense to copyright infringement.
With respect to defamation, in Sullivan, the Supreme Court concluded
that the First Amendment requires that some injury to reputation must be
tolerated.366 Initially, the Court made clear that defamation is limited to false
statements of facts and cannot be imposed based upon a speaker’s opinions or
ideas.367 With respect to false statements of fact, the Supreme Court requires public
officials and public figures to prove constitutional malice: that the defamatory
statement was made with the knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard
for the truth.368 In cases in which private individuals are defamed as part of
discussions of public issues, the Court prohibits states from imposing liability
without fault, and requires constitutional malice for the imposition of heightened
penalties like punitive damages.369 In the absence of imposing these new standards
of liability, the Supreme Court concluded that speech would be unconstitutionally
chilled by fear of damage awards.370 Under these circumstances, the affirmative
defense of truth did not alleviate this concern, because speakers may still be
deterred from speaking “even though it is believed to be true and even though it is
in fact true, because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the
expense of having to do so.”371 Limiting the ability of individuals to successfully
vindicate reputational harm was, therefore, necessary to create sufficient breathing
room for an open and robust marketplace of ideas.372
Sullivan and its progeny serve as useful markers for establishing the line
between protecting the financial interests of copyright owners and the preservation
of a vibrant marketplace of ideas. While the defamation analogy may not dictate
whether copyright should be limited to virtual appropriation, it certainly suggests
the importance of imposing clearer limits on liability even if clarity is only
achieved by tolerating some injury to the copyright owner. While limiting
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340 (“there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact”).
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271-73.
367 Id. at 271-72.
368 Id. at 279-81.
369
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349.
370 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 277-79.
371 Id. at 279.
372 Rather than limiting liability, an alternative approach would not have changed the standard for
liability but would have limited the damages that may be awarded. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 771 (1985) (White, J. concurring) (“The necessary breathing room
for speakers can be ensured by limitations on recoverable damages . . . .”); Richard Epstein, Was New
York Times v. Sullivan Wrong?, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 782 (1986); Pierre Leval, The No-Money, No Fault
Libel Suit: Keeping Sullivan in Its Proper Place, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1287 (1988).
365
366

213

VOL. 17:2

VIRGINIA SPORTS AND ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL

SPRING 2018

copyright liability to virtual appropriation is the clearest way to achieve this
clarity, clarity could also be achieved by categorically exempting certain uses
including education, news reporting, non-commercial uses, comments, criticism,
and parody. Similarly, the defamation cases suggest that liability cannot be
imposed without fault. At the very least, this suggests that copyright liability for
subconscious copying is unconstitutional. Likewise, because fair use is an
affirmative defense, it should no longer be relied upon to create the necessary
breathing room for freedom of expression. Like the defense of truth, the possibility
of a successful fair use defense is insufficient to dispel the chill of copyright
liability. This does not mean that fair use no longer has a role in copyright, only
that fair use no longer reconciles copyright restrictions upon expression and the
First Amendment’s protection of freedom of expression.
C. Insufficient Government Interests
First Amendment scrutiny will also require courts to evaluate the
arguments put forward to support greater restrictions upon expression. Is a policy
of expanding copyright to make investments in copyright more lucrative or to
protect the economic interests of existing copyright holders a legitimate
governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression? Beyond virtual
appropriation, copyright goes beyond the original purpose of preventing market
failure and its complementary function of making markets for speech more
efficient. While preventing virtual appropriation as a response to market failure is
clearly a legitimate if not compelling governmental interest,373 at first glance,
neither the goal of increasing economic incentives nor protecting existing
economic interests, represent legitimate let alone compelling governmental
interests.374
For the sake of this discussion, let us assume that increasing copyright
protection does in fact increase the incentives for authors to create and invest in
new works.375 Under these circumstances, copyright would essentially be
subsidizing copyright proprietors to increase their power in the marketplace of
ideas. By granting exclusive rights to expression beyond virtual appropriation,
copyright gives copyright proprietors the power to act as gatekeepers for a wide
array of speech markets. This gatekeeping power allows them both to suppress
competing expression within a given market and to use that control to generate
wealth, thus increasing their relative ability to influence other markets for
expression. There is no First Amendment precedent for such a goal.
With few exceptions, the Supreme Court has concluded that it is not a
legitimate government interest to regulate expression to improve the marketplace
of ideas even if it is to allow speakers with fewer resources or access to media of
mass communication to convey their messages as effectively as those with such
373

While the reproduction prong of virtual appropriation, preventing someone from telling the same
story is consistent with copyright as originally conceived at the founding era, the additional protection
of derivative works, the power to prevent others from retelling the story in a different medium, was not
recognized at the time.
374 Joseph Fishman argues that increased copyright restraint can lead to greater creativity, see Fishman,
supra note 238. To the extent that the government’s interest in suppressing expression is a desire for
greater variation of expression, it is at odds with the First Amendment. See Turner Broadcasting System,
Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 643-44 (1994) (finding that ‘must carry’ rules were content neutral because
they focused upon the means television programs were transmitted and not their content).
375
There is virtually no empirical evidence to support this claim. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186,
254-55 (2003) (Breyer, J dissenting). See also Raymond Shih Ray Ku et al., Does Copyright Promote
Creativity? An Empirical Analysis of Copyright’s Bounty, 62 Vand. L. Rev. 1669 (2009).
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resources.376 In the few cases that the Court did consider that purpose legitimate,
its conclusion was based upon the concentrated market power of the speaker that
essentially allowed them to act as gatekeepers. 377 The purpose of increasing
copyright protection beyond virtual appropriation is the exact opposite of the First
Amendment access and campaign finance cases.378 Increasing copyright protection
beyond virtual appropriation gives copyright owners gatekeeping power and the
ability to use that power to increase the relative wealth disparities in the market.
There may be a certain appeal to this when that power is used by the artistic Davids
of the world -- an unemployed J.K. Rowling, for example -- to prevent
overreaching Goliaths from stealing their works. However, because copyright
protection is biased in favor existing copyright owners, it is more likely that
modern day Goliaths -- Walt Disney, for example -- will silence, or at least bully,
the artistic Davids. If a purpose of reducing disparities in the marketplace of ideas
and preventing certain speakers from acting as gatekeepers does not always satisfy
intermediate scrutiny, the purpose of increasing those disparities and providing
copyright owners with even greater gatekeeping power should most certainly not.
Even more damning, under these circumstances, exclusive rights are
clearly related to the suppression of expression. Increasing a copyright owner’s
incentives is achieved by preventing others from using copyrighted works as part
of their own expression. For example, even without the derivative work right, J.K.
Rowling can create and license motion pictures based upon her books, and the
reproduction right would prevent others from pirating her books and the motion
pictures. The derivative work right, however, grants Rowling the additional power
to suppress expression by prohibiting the creation and distribution of any other
motion pictures based upon her writings. Likewise, she may suppress any other
expression substantially similar to or based upon her works. The suppression of
speech is the mechanism that allows Rowling to reap monopoly rewards. While
some may believe that Rowling should be entitled to this privilege because it will
provide her with greater incentives to write Harry Potter, it is unfair, or because
borrowing from her is insufficiently creative, regardless of the justification,
copyright’s purpose is clearly related to the suppression of expression. Once again,
under First Amendment analysis, this is problematic, to put it mildly.
Relatedly, to the extent that copyright responds to more than market
failure but is a quid pro quo between the public and authors, there is no quid for
the public quo. In addition to responding to market failure, copyright is also
described as a quid pro quo in which the public is willing to provide authors with
copyright protection in exchange for creating works, making them available to the
public, and upon the expiration of copyright protection, for the work to become
part of the public domain.379 Once again, prohibiting virtual appropriation has
historically been understood to ensure this quid pro quo. However, there is no such
guarantee beyond virtual appropriation. While greater protection may provide
greater financial rewards for copyright owners, these rewards come with no
obligation to create new works of their own. For example, the copyright owners
of Seinfeld did not have to create a trivia book before they could prevent the
creation and publication of the SAT, and they were under no obligation to do so.380
376

See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241,
254 (1974).
377 See Turner Broadcasting, 512 U.S. at 643-45; Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 392
(1969).
378
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14.
379 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 214.
380 See supra Part III.B.
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Copyright law allows J.D. Salinger to prohibit the writing and publication of a
sequel to Catcher in the Rye even when he has no intention of writing a sequel of
his own. Authors and copyright owners may wish to create substantially similar
works, perform their works publicly, or create any number of derivative works,
but they are under no obligation to do so. If they create those works, a limited
reproduction right protects those works from piracy. To the extent that copyright
owners license such opportunities to others, which is usually what occurs because
novelists are not filmmakers, toymakers, or computer programmers, the licensee
provides the quo. The copyright owner only provides permission.
D. Inadequate Tailoring
Finally, assuming that there are legitimate interests unrelated to the
suppression of expression that justify extending protection beyond virtual
appropriation, the First Amendment requires courts to consider whether the means
chosen are sufficiently tailored to protect those interests while preserving freedom
of speech. Courts will need to consider whether protecting copyright holders
beyond prohibiting virtual appropriation burdens “substantially more speech than
is necessary to further the government's legitimate interests.”381 As the Supreme
Court more recently stated,
The purpose of the test is not to consider whether the
challenged restriction has some effect in achieving Congress’
goal, regardless of the restriction it imposes. The purpose of the
test is to ensure that speech is restricted no further than
necessary to achieve the goal, for it is important to assure that
legitimate speech is not chilled or punished.382
The Supreme Court’s decision is especially noteworthy because a majority of the
Court concluded that the availability of commercial Internet filtering software
represented a less restrictive means of protecting children from unwanted exposure
to online content.383 The Court reached this conclusion despite Justice Breyer’s
dissenting argument that the majority essentially concluded that doing nothing was
a less restrictive alternative.384 Because parents already had the option to use
filtering software, he would have asked whether there were less restrictive steps
the government could take in addition to the status quo.385 So, are the less
restrictive alternatives to protect the interests of copyright owners beyond
prohibiting virtual appropriation?386
Depending upon the interest being asserted, there are a wide variety of
alternatives to the recognition of exclusive rights in expression. Are alternative
protections including the right of attribution -- to be accurately identified as the
author -- or alternative means of compensation such as compulsory licensing
381

Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U. S. 781, 799 (1989).
Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656, 666 (2004).
383 Id. at 667.
384 Id. at 684 (“It is always less restrictive to do nothing than to do something.”) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
385 Id.
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sufficient to protect the interests of copyright owners? 387 Would a right of first
refusal or a right of first adaptation for derivative works respond to the moral and
fairness concerns when someone wants to retell the same story in a different
medium? Does Congress go too far in burdening free expression when it relies
upon exclusive rights instead? And, to what extent does the length of copyright
protection impact all of these considerations? It may be that copyright protection
was sufficiently tailored when authors were required to take affirmative steps to
obtain and maintain copyright protection for an initial period of fourteen years.
Under those circumstances, the default would be free expression, and when an
author took the necessary steps to prevent others from using their work, new
authors would be able to make use of them in their lifetimes. It is more difficult to
conclude that copyright is narrowly tailored when it prevents three generations of
authors from making all but de minimis uses of a work as part of their own creative
expression.
Consider the derivative work right once again. The derivative work right
currently allows copyright owners to control any work based upon and
incorporating the original.388 As a supplement to the reproduction right, it goes
beyond the original need to prevent market failure. It allows copyright owners to
prevent a filmmaker from making a motion picture based upon their novel; a
painter from painting a scene from their motion picture, a sculptor from sculpting
their character, and sequels and prequels in any means of expression, including
those not yet invented. As the creator of Star Wars: Episode IV – A New Hope,
under the derivative work right, George Lucas could not only create sequels to the
original, license toys, costumes, novels, television programs, and video games, but
could prevent anyone else from doing the same and even from creating anything
new in the Star Wars universe. And, now, because Disney owns the copyright,389
Disney may prevent even Lucas from creating new stories and works based upon
his far, far away galaxy. While Lucas introduced audiences to the Star Wars
universe, he did not create it, at least not in the biblical sense. While he told stories
of Luke Skywalker and Darth Vader and about the struggle between Jedi and the
Sith, he did not give form to every rock and stone, every creature, every individual
in that universe, and he certainly did not tell all the stories that could be told. Yet,
copyright prevents anyone from using their imagination and creativity to explore
and give form to any part of that universe or to write new chapters in the struggle
between the light and the dark. Given the breadth of this right, the derivative work
right arguably represents the antithesis of narrow tailoring.390
In this context, copyright and defamation share one last thing in
common: both can be vindicated without resorting to monetary damages. This is
important because in both cases, it is the fear of crippling financial judgments and
the cost of defending against such claims that chills free expression.391 While
387

Compulsory licensing allows recording artists to cover other music and allows cable companies to
retransmit television broadcasts, among others. It is also an alternative means of compensating copyright
holders for downloaded content. See generally Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of
Copyright: Napster and the New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 263, 305-15
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388 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
389 Matt Krantz et al., Disney buys Lucasfilm for $4 billion, USA Today, (Oct. 30, 2012, 10:15 PM),
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For an excellent critique of the derivative work right, see Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination:
Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112 Yale L.J. 1 (2002); see also Tushnet, supra note 47, at 541-42.
391 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277 (1964) (“The fear of damage awards . . . may be
markedly more inhibiting than the fear of prosecution under a criminal statute.”).
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Sullivan addressed this by clarifying and raising the liability standard for
successful defamation lawsuits,392 and courts could do the same in copyright, this
is not the only solution. In Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Buildings, Justice
White argued that the “necessary breathing room for speakers can be ensured by
limitations on recoverable damages; it does not also require depriving public
figures of any room to vindicate their reputations.”393 Limiting the remedies
available to defamation plaintiffs by recognizing only nominal damages and/or a
declaration of falsity, defamation law would still protect individual reputation and
freedom of speech.394 This alternative deserves serious consideration as Sullivan
has been criticized for both inadequately protecting individuals from defamation
and, more importantly, failing to reduce the fear and cost of litigation in cases
involving public figures.395 With respect to the latter, constitutional malice only
shifts the focus of defamation suits from whether the speech was false and injured
the plaintiff’s reputation to whether the plaintiff is a public figure. 396
To the extent that Sullivan did not sufficiently dispel the chill of
defamation litigation and liability, Congress and the courts should reconsider
copyright remedies in addition to liability. It is difficult to argue with the idea that
Lucas deserves recognition, acknowledgement, even praise when others build
upon his work as part of their own creative expression. But recognition,
acknowledgement, and praise are not the same as control. Limiting copyright’s
remedies to require attribution and/or disclaimers or to limit the monetary awards
for infringement will certainly represent less restrictive and less chilling
alternatives to copyright’s current remedies which include the potential for
significant penalties in the form of monetary damages, statutory damages, punitive
damages as well as criminal liability, injunctions, and the destruction of the
infringing works.
So, what’s the big deal? It’s a big deal because entertainment is speech.
It’s a big deal to the entertainers who choose to express themselves with the works
of others. It’s a big deal to audiences who want access to that speech. And, it’s a
big deal because restricting expression is inconsistent with freedom of speech.
VI. CONCLUSION
The First Amendment and the Copyright Clause can protect and promote
freedom of expression. Nonetheless, they also exist in tension with one another.
While the creation of exclusive rights to expression can promote freedom of
speech, by its very nature, copyright suppresses expression. In other words, it is
strong medicine, and like chemotherapy, creating exclusive rights in expression
can cure what ails us, but can also destroy what is healthy. In its first incarnation,
392
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the Licensing Act, exclusive rights to print became the vehicle for government
censorship and the mechanism for monopoly control of the print industry. 397 The
Anglo-American tradition of protecting freedom of expression, including the
adoption of the First Amendment, was a direct response to this threat to speech.398
So too were the Statute of Anne and the Copyright Clause, which repurposed these
exclusive rights for the public benefit.399
Very early on, courts recognized that copyright can be a threat to itself.
Aggressive interpretation and enforcement of copyright would threaten the very
expression it was meant to promote. For well over a century, together with
Congress, the judicial branch has attempted to resolve this conflict internally
within copyright without reference to the First Amendment. The doctrine of fair
use and the idea/expression doctrine became the principle pillars to uphold
copyright’s value of expression. And while these can and do uphold the freedom
of authors to create their own expression, as internal limits within copyright, it
raises the very real possibility that judges will overlook the First Amendment
forest for the copyright trees. The promise of creative freedom under copyright is
not necessarily equivalent to the freedom guaranteed by the First Amendment. Fair
use is not free speech. As this Article demonstrates, this problem is real.
Moreover, as this Article argues, the Supreme Court created a third pillar
to uphold First Amendment values as well. While courts have interpreted the
Supreme Court decision in Bleistein as a warning to avoid evaluating the execution
of a copyrighted work (i.e., is 2 Live Crew’s song a good song, or a good parody?),
they have ignored or failed to appreciate the more fundamental significance of
Bleistein. According to Justice Holmes, the Copyright Clause prohibits Congress
and the Courts from discriminating against authors because the subject matter of
their works may be considered unimportant or unworthy. To reiterate, the true
meaning of the non-discrimination principle is a promise that copyright will treat
all works of authorship equally. It will provide authors with the same degree of
protection and the same degree of freedom. By adopting this principle, Justice
Holmes not only articulated one of the bedrock principles of copyright law, he
anticipated what would become one of the bedrock principles of First Amendment
law as well: the prohibition against content-based discrimination.
Unfortunately, as this Article also demonstrates, not only have courts
ignored or failed to recognize the full implications of Bleistein, they have
undermined the two other pillars as well. By discriminating against works of
entertainment, copyright infringes upon the freedom of expression of authors
creating such works. Beginning with a simple, yet disconcerting question, this
Article argues that copyright currently suppresses the creativity that it is supposed
to promote and does so through a bizarre series of contradictions and hypocrisies
allowing judges to restrict expression based upon their subjective interpretation of
the value of that expression. The fact that courts engaged in this discrimination for
so long neither excuses nor justifies this restriction. As Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes once wrote:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so
it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting
if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long
See generally Paul Goldstein, Copyright’s Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial Jukebox
(Rev. Ed. 2003) (discussing the history and origins of copyright law).
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since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the
past.400

There may be reasons for restricting the freedom of speakers when their speech is
primarily intended to entertain audiences. It may likewise be Constitutional to base
this discrimination upon subjective evaluations of the value of those contributions
or their relative worth compared works of science, social science or fine art.
However, blind imitation neither justifies the practice nor supports its
Constitutional legitimacy.
While this Article has outlined copyright’s First Amendment problems
and identified some possible solutions, it is only a beginning. And, while the
problem is complicated and addressing it will be challenging, it is a problem that
cannot be ignored. In the 18th Century when copyright was adopted, the expressive
world was a world of scarcity.401 The economics of printing and subsequent means
of distributing expression relied heavily upon the exclusive rights created by
copyright. After all, neither authors nor audiences are served if they cannot reach
one another. Copyright made that possible, even if it resulted in distributors
gaining significant power and wealth because of their control over the means of
distribution. This is no longer the world in which we currently live. The arrival of
digital technology has created a world in which expression is no longer scarce by
its very nature or due to the economics associated with its creation and
distribution.402 Just the opposite. We live in a world of potentially limitless
abundance. This is a world where everyone can become an author and reach
audiences large and small who appreciate their creative expression. Some will
create entirely new worlds while others will mix, remix, mashup, and otherwise
use the works of others as raw material for their own expression. In the 21st
century, the old economics no longer apply.403 And, while copyright may still play
an important role in this world, it poses the very real danger of subtracting more
expression than it adds.
For artists, it is hard enough to hear one’s muse and find the confidence
to tell one’s story without the noise of others telling you what you can and cannot
do, that the story you wish to tell or the way you wish to tell it is not right, proper,
or good enough. Copyright should not add fear to that self-doubt -- fear of serious
legal consequence for violating rules that defy definition. We all deserve the right
to prevent others from pirating our stories, and we all deserve the freedom to tell
our stories as we see fit. For too long, copyright has balanced these two principles
on the backs of authors of entertainment in a manner that simultaneously exalts
and denigrates their works. It is time to end copyright’s double standard, and to
begin protecting and promoting the rights and freedom of all authors.
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